













Security incidents targeting all kinds of computerised systems occur on a daily
basis within most organisations and vulnerability records increase steadily. The
modern industry hence demands secure and reliable systems and calls for good
methods for security risk analysis in order to identify the threat picture. CORAS
is a method for conducting security risk analysis, and similar to most security risk
analysis methods, it may involve participants from totally different professions
and background that hardly speak the same language.
We have developed a tool-supported method, SCORE, that aims to deal with
problems related to one of the sub-processes of a CORAS security risk analysis,
namely risk estimation. SCORE applies to CORAS diagrams, a special pur-
pose graphical language designed to facilitate communication between roles of
different professions, that are used to describe risk and threat scenarios.
This thesis presents and documents the results from the SCORE project. Its main
contribution is the SCORE tool-supported method that consists of two distinct,
but closely related modules; the SCORE method and the SCORE tool. The first
defines rules for processing input from the risk estimation process in a structured
fashion and standardises the risk estimation process of a CORAS security risk
analysis. The latter is a computerised tool integrated with the existing CORAS
tool designed to support the SCORE method by implementing its defined rules.
The SCORE tool-supported method has successfully been evaluated on a CORAS
security risk analysis supported by SCORE. Together with formal evaluation
techniques, SCORE has come to the conclusion that a carefully designed tool-
supported method will increase the efficiency of risk estimation using CORAS
diagrams.
The thesis furthermore provides documentation of how to execute the SCORE
method, and documentation in terms of software requirements and architec-
tural design such that the SCORE tool may be fully extended to a commercial
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Computer security is undoubtedly one of the fast-growing areas in today’s
rapidly changing IT industry. As technology gets more and more complex
and providing us with endless opportunities and features, it opens doors also to
those who come with malignant motives. In 2006 IBM Internet Security Systems
X-Forcerresearch and development team registered a 39.5 percent increase over
2005 in new vulnerability records and expects the trend to continue also in 2007
[1]. In order to face the rising demands of modern times, the industry calls for
means for security risk management to protect their business. A security risk
analysis may then be the foremost instrument to identify the threat picture in
order to decide what security technologies to implement.
While security risk management is an increasing priority in many organisations
today, we see that generally in IT projects and no less for those related to security
risk analysis, IT professionals and their clients hardly speak the same language
[2]. A security risk analysis involves experts from completely different profes-
sions and backgrounds. The security risk analysis targets systems that may be
of great complexity, thus requiring exhaustive cooperation between the partici-
pants involved. This brings about the demand for well-developed methods for
conducting security risk analyses and for supporting tools to make the execution
of the analysis perform painlessly.
CORAS [3] is a method for conducting security risk analysis. Designed with
the purpose to facilitate communication between roles of different professions,
CORAS offers a special purpose graphical language (so-called CORAS diagrams)
to describe what we call risk and threat scenarios. A CORAS security risk analysis
consists of five phases, each of which makes use of structured brainstorming to
1
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extract information about the system under evaluation needed to create the
CORAS diagrams. The result of a risk analysis is an identified threat picture
with evaluated risks of which some may require treatment.
This work, from now referred to as the SCORE project, focuses on one of the
sub-processes of a CORAS security risk analysis, namely the process of risk
estimation. This is the phase where the identified risks are evaluated with
respect to likelihood and consequence values. When accomplished, the results
of this phase allow the risks to be evaluated with respect to whether they should
be treated or be accepted. The SCORE project aims to overcome the problem of
practical and theoretical performance in the estimation of likelihood values.
The outcome of the SCORE project will be a tool-supported method. With the
SCORE integrated CORAS, we believe the risk analysis participants will find it
easier to pin their expertise towards the core of the risk estimation problems and
not be distracted or confused by practicality and comprehensibility obstacles.
1.1 Motivation
In order for the risk analysts involved to lead and execute an optimum security
risk analysis, they should have the best tools and methods adapted to accom-
modate their needs. CORAS does not fulfil these needs when it comes to the
risk estimation phase. Studies show that during risk estimation in CORAS,
there is often confusion and too much conjecture that may lead to inaccuracies
in estimated values [4]. There is no tool-support for combining or processing
the input from the field experts and no clearly defined method for calculating
probabilities. Furthermore, CORAS does not properly account for how to treat
qualitative input combined with precise, numerical, quantitative data.
The main objective for the SCORE project is to develop a special purpose method
and tool to support the risk estimation phase of CORAS.
1.2 Contribution
The SCORE project has developed a tool-supported method to be used in the risk
estimation phase of a CORAS security risk analysis. The tool-supported method
consists or two distinct modules; the SCORE method and the SCORE tool, where
the SCORE tool relies and uses the results from the SCORE method (illustrated
in figure 1.1.
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The SCORE method The SCORE tool
< uses
The SCORE tool-supported method
Figure 1.1: The SCORE project overview
The SCORE method defines how to perform the risk estimation based on CORAS
diagrams. The method is formalised as a set of rules. Created with the intention
of being supported by the tool, the rules assemble the basis upon which the
tool is implemented. The method nevertheless constitutes a unique and stand-
alone contribution of this project, evaluated as such. In theory, the method
could be applied to a risk analysis manually with the rule definitions in hand.
However, such employment of the method could be a complicated and long-
winded process, something the SCORE tool aims to deal with.
The SCORE tool implements the rules defined by the SCORE method, but also
contributes to the risk analysis itself. Important to notice is that the tool is
implemented as a prototype used to prove the realisation, validity and practical
utility of the method. At the same time, the tool proves the necessity of the
method being tool-supported in order for the risk analysts to willingly adopt the
SCORE method due to the complexity of the latter.
To summarise; SCORE is a method for qualitative and quantitative risk estima-
tion supported by a computerised tool integrated in the existing CORAS tool. It
aims to simplify the process of risk estimation for the risk analysis team by offer-
ing an automation of risk estimation calculations through a specially designed
tool interface. In short, it provides a Simplified CORAS Risk Estimation method,
hence the SCORE abbreviation.
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1.3 Thesis structure
The thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 1 Introduction
Introduces the reader to our domain of interest and the SCORE project. It
also motivates the need for and describes the contribution from the SCORE
project.
Chapter 2 Background
Provides background material that is used as basis and/or inspiration to the
development of the SCORE project. Covers security risk analysis, CORAS
diagrams and established threat and risk modelling techniques.
Chapter 3 Problem analysis
Conducts a problem analysis for the SCORE project. It introduces and
explains main notions and provides the problem characterisation. Fur-
thermore, it motivates the need for the SCORE project and carefully char-
acterises the requirements to this project in terms of success criteria.
Chapter 4 The SCORE method
Defines a set of rules for the behaviour of the SCORE method.
Chapter 5 Requirements for the tool
Introduces an overall vision of the tool and presents the requirements for
the tool in terms of software requirements.
Chapter 6 The SCORE tool
Provides a full presentation of the SCORE tool implementation. It covers
all abstraction layers from a high-level user view with live screen shots,
through the architectural design and to the implementation specific details.
Chapter 7 Evaluation
Evaluates the SCORE method and tool based on a case study, software test-
ing and non-empirical evaluation and discusses the liability of the results.
Chapter 8 Fulfilment of the success criteria of SCORE project
Validates the SCORE method and tool with respect to its defined success
criteria and identified requirements.
Chapter 9 Discussion
Evaluates experiences and findings from the SCORE project research.
Chapter 10 Conclusion
Sums up the main findings and recommendations for the SCORE project
and suggests future work.
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The SCORE project relates to several special fields, ranging from IT-disciplines
such as software engineering, programming languages and of course computer
security, to mathematical approaches to probability and fuzzy logic. In particular,
the SCORE project studies security risk assessment based on CORAS that in
turn applies various methods and techniques. These may be well-known and
incorporated into the best practise of security risk assessment, or state of the
art research under development as we speak. Anyhow; this chapter gives the
reader an introduction to the background material she needs to get down to the
rest of the thesis. Those already familiar with this material can skip the whole
chapter or simply use it as a reference without missing any contribution from
the SCORE project.
In order to understand our domain of interest, we first introduce the reader to the
practise of security risk assessment. More precisely, we study CORAS security
risk analysis with special focus on the security risk analysis sub-process of risk
estimation.
The SCORE method builds on the established security risk analysis theories for
risk estimation and applies them to CORAS diagrams. To understand CORAS
diagrams sufficiently, we present the syntax, semantics and intended use of the
CORAS diagrams in detail where it comprises the affected elements of the risk
estimation phase.
When we develop our method, we are inspired by well-known risk analysis
techniques such as FTA [5] and ETA [6] and how they use diagrams in the
estimation process. We extract the core of the different notions using the ISO/IEC
7
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14977 EBNF [7] standard. This will allow us to compare them to each other later
on.
This chapter aims to introduce the reader not familiar with security risk as-
sessment and the CORAS framework to the practise of security risk analysis.
In particular, we focus on the process of risk estimation based on the CORAS
method, and we provide the reader with a brief introduction to selected relevant
techniques that constitutes the basis for and/or yields inspiration to the SCORE
project.
2.1 Security risk analysis
1.3.14 Risk analysis:
"systematic process to understand the nature of and to deduce the level of
risk"
AS/NZS 4360:2004 [8]
The CORAS method is to a large extent based on the worldwide acknowledged
Australian/New Zealand StandardrAS/NZS 4360:2004 for risk management [8].
The quotation above from this standard defines precisely what is the context of
risk analysis. In CORAS we talk about CORAS security risk analysis which we
abbreviate to simply risk analysis.
Risk analysis attempts to answer three fundamental questions [9]:
• what can go wrong (by hazard identification)
• how likely is this to happen (by frequency analysis)
• what are the consequences (by consequence analysis)
When we have the answer to these questions, we say we have identified the risk
picture. Following AS/NZS 4360 CORAS divides the risk analysis process into 5
phases: (1) context establishment, (2) risk identification, (3) risk estimation, (4)
risk evaluation and (5) treatment identification.
CORAS diagrams applies to all of them. In the context establishment, asset
diagrams are used to specify the assets within the target in relation to their
stakeholders. Another type, what we call threat diagrams, applies to the next
two phases where risks are identified and estimated. The fourth phase uses risk
diagrams while how risks are treated are documented in treatment diagrams.
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2.2 Established threat and risk modelling techniques
Below we study established threat and risk modelling techniques. The chosen
techniques are fault tree analysis (FTA), event tree analysis (ETA) and attack tree
analysis (ATA). We base our selection of techniques on recommendations from
the SINTEF risk analysis guide [6] together with investigations of the SCORE
project needs.
2.2.1 Fault tree analysis (FTA)
A fault tree [5] is a logical diagram describing the relation between an unwanted
incident in a system and the reasons causing the incident. The tree is a variant of
an AND/OR tree with the unwanted incident as the root or the top event. The tree
grows top down; each node’s children creating a sub tree successively down to
the leaf nodes. The leaf nodes are defined as the initiating events. It is up to the
creator of the tree to decide the level of details for the leaf nodes according to the
target of analysis.
Traditional fault tree analysis involves determination of minimal cut-sets. Min-
imal cut sets are all the unique combinations of component failures that can
cause system failure. A qualitative analysis of the fault tree would start with the
minimal cut set to identify the initiating event(s) causing the unwanted incident.
Each node in the fault tree can be labelled with numbers representing failure
probability. This may be hard to obtain, but if we assume independent events and
that the probabilities of the initiating events can be estimated, we could perform
a quantitative analysis. A computer system could calculate the probability of
each node of the minimal cut set resulting in the estimated probability of the
top event. Note that each estimated probability should be given in terms of a
limited time-frame. The probability of the top event would then correspond to
the frequency the top event occurs.
Possible results of a fault tree analysis:
• a list of possible combinations of environmental factors, human mistakes,
normal scenarios and component error leading to an unwanted incident
• the probability for unwanted incidents to occur within a certain time period
(frequency)
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Probability aggregation
Each node in the fault tree can be assigned a probability value. When all leaf
nodes have a probability value, the fault tree can aggregate these values upwards
the tree to the top.
Probability aggregation in fault trees are conducted based on the ports they
aggregate over. Logical OR gates summarise the input events, while AND gates
multiplies. Suppose top event te caused by event e1(l1) to en(ln) with the likelihood
values l1 to ln, respectively through an OR (2.1) and an AND (2.2) gate:
lt = l1 + l2 + . . . + ln (2.1)
lt = l1 × l2 × . . . × ln (2.2)
where lt is the aggregated probability value for top event te.
Constructs




– root – unwanted incident
– intermediate
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EBNF-presentation of fault tree
Syntax presentation on extended Backus-Naur form:
<tree> := <node>|<node>AND<tree-set>|<node>OR<tree-set>|<node><tree>
<tree-set> := {tree}|{tree}U<tree-set>
Examples of FTA application


















Figure 2.1: Example of construction of fault tree from BNF notation
Note that the numbers in brackets denotes probabilities while the others are only
to identify each unique node and can be found in the syntactical presentation
below.
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Syntactical presentation of the same tree (from figure 2.1) with the notations






















The fault tree analysis technique has shown to be most successful in risk- and
reliability analysis. It was originally invented by the BOEING COMPANY in
1961 for system safety analysis [5]. A fault tree can be used for qualitative
analysis, quantitative analysis or both. During a design phase, the fault tree
analysis could reveal "hidden" errors caused by component faults.
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2.2.2 Event tree analysis (ETA)
An event tree [6] is a logical diagram describing possible event chains caused
by an undesirable initiating critical event. An event chain is a series of events
caused by other events. It starts by the initiating event and results in an accident.
The purpose of the technique is to identify the critical event chains and help
mitigate their negative effects.
The root or the top event of the event tree is the initiating event. The tree is binary
(however not strict – a node may have only one child, but never more than two)
and each following event is ordered at the next level in the tree. At each event




– root – initiating event
– intermediate
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EBNF-presentation of event tree
Syntax presentation on extended Backus-Naur form:
<event tree> : = <initiator><tree>
<tree> : = <node><success><failure>
<success> : = <tree>|<terminal>
<failure> : = <tree>|<terminal>
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Figure 2.2: Example of construction of event tree from BNF notation
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Syntactical presentation of the same tree (from figure 2.2) with the notations




















An event tree analysis is a part of most reliable risk analysis’s of technical systems.
The technique can also be used in reliability analysis.
2.2.3 Attack tree analysis (ATA)
The attack tree analysis [10] is a methodical way of describing threats against,
and countermeasures protecting a system. The technique is developed by the
computer security specialist Bruce Schneier with the purpose of being used in
threat modelling of computer systems. The technique provides a methodical
way of representing the security of systems.
The attack tree represents attacks against a computer system in an AND/OR tree
structure with the goal as the root node or the top event. The goal is the defined
objective of the attack and can possibly be achieved through any minimal cut set
of the tree from the leaves to the root.
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The analysis of the tree is analogous to the traditional fault tree analysis. The
minimal cut set consists of one or more initiating event depending of the logic





– root – unwanted incident (goal of the attack)
– intermediate




EBNF-presentation of attack tree




The intended use for this technique is threat modelling of computer systems. The
attack tree provides abilities to make calculations about security and compare
the security of different systems.
2.3 CORAS diagrams
CORAS diagrams are created using a customised modelling language. Figure
2.3 shows an example of a threat diagram with explanations of the diagram
elements (they are of course not a part of the language). Although there are
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various CORAS diagrams for different phases and purposes, we only consider
threat diagrams due to the scope of the SCORE project.
Figure 2.3: CORAS diagram example
2.3.1 Syntax
The syntax of CORAS diagrams1 is explained three different ways. First we give
a textual explanations of all the constructs (diagram elements) thereafter display
them graphically. Finally we present the constructs using EBNF notation.
Constructs
Explaining the diagram elements would be a natural part of any risk analysis
where there are participants present without prior knowledge to CORAS di-
agrams. During the risk analysis the participants will together with the risk
analysis team model different CORAS diagrams using these constructs. It is of
high importance that the participants know the definition of the graphical sym-
bols in order to perform correct modelling. Figure 2.4 presents the constructs
1Although the SCORE tool-supported method applies to threat diagrams exclusively (hence
do not bring all of the possible diagram elements into use), we have chosen to present the totality
of the constructs instead of leaving just a few out. The legal constructs for threat diagrams are:
threats (all), vulnerability, threat scenario, unwanted incident, asset, initiate and impact relationship,
likelihood, consequence, AND and OR.
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graphically as they are used in CORAS diagrams and table 2.1 explains each of



















Initiate relationship Impact relationship
[likelihood] [consequence]
Vulnerability
Figure 2.4: CORAS constructs
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Element Description
stakeholder those people and organisations who may affect, be
affected by, or perceive themselves to be affected by, a
decision or activity regarding the target of analysis
asset something to which a stakeholder directly assigns
value and, hence, for which the stakeholder requires
protection
vulnerability weaknesses which can be exploited by one or more
threats
threat a potential cause of an unwanted incident, can be cate-
gorised as either human or non-human (environmen-
tal), human threats can also be said to have accidental
or deliberate origin
unwanted incident an event that may harm or reduce the value of assets
and is something we want to prevent
risk the chance of something happening that will have an
impact upon objectives (assets), defined to consist of
an unwanted incident, a likelihood measure and a
consequence
likelihood a general description of frequency or probability
consequence damage to an asset
treatment the selection and implementation of appropriate op-
tions for dealing with risk
Table 2.1: CORAS constructs definitions
EBNF-presentation of coras diagrams
Syntax of CORAS diagrams presented using EBNF [12] notation:
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<relation> := <initiate>|<impact>;
<initiate> := <threat>          <threat scenario> |
<threat>          <unwanted incident> |
<threat scenario>          <threat scenario> |
<threat scenario>          <unwanted incident> |
<unwanted incident>          <threat scenario> |
<unwanted incident>          <unwanted incident>;
<impact> := <unwanted incident>      <asset> |
<threat scenario>    <asset>;
<threat> := <deliberate threat> | <accidental threat> | <non-human threat>;
<deliberate threat> := identi!er;
<accidental threat> := identi!er;
<non-human threat> := identi!er;
<vulnerability set> := {vulnerability} − ;
<vulnerability> := identi!er;
<threat scenario> := identi!er [(<likelihood>)];
<unwanted incident> := identi!er [(<likelihood>)];
<asset> := identi!er;
<likelihood> := ’Linguistic term’ | ’Numerical value’;
<consequence> := ’Linguistic term’ | ’Numerical value’;









The CORAS guideline [13] explains how to use CORAS diagrams through an
example driven introduction. Threat diagrams that SCORE applies to are subject
to the risk identification and risk estimation phases. The first phase identifies
unwanted incidents, threat scenarios, vulnerabilities and their causing threats
while the latter takes these as input and applies risk estimations.
The risk estimation phase aims to assign likelihood and consequence values to
unwanted incidents. Likelihoods may be expressed as frequency values (i.e. 5
times per year) or probability values (i.e. 0.3 or 30% probability). They may either
be qualitative linguistic values (such as often) or quantitative numerical values
(as already exemplified). Numerical values are often defined in the context
identification as numerical sets mapped to the linguistic expressions since they
are easier to relate to and work with.
Consequence values are assigned to the relation between unwanted incidents
and assets in a similar manner, but their value (qualitative or quantitative) varies
with respect to the current asset under investigation and how this is measured.
2.3. CORAS DIAGRAMS 21
There are different strategies to come up with the likelihood values for unwanted
incidents. If the risk analysis participants have statistics or other knowledge of
the incidents, they may be assigned directly. Often this is not the case due to the
complexity of the unwanted incident and that it may be composed by a number
of threat scenarios or even other unwanted incidents. The participants then try
to estimate likelihoods for the related threat scenarios and the risk analysis team
will use this information to combine an aggregated likelihood for the unwanted
incident. When there are still problems extracting enough reliable data, the risk
analysis team may suggest basing the estimations on historical data or personal
experiences, or attempt to perform a fault tree analysis for precise calculations.
In cases where likelihoods are assigned to threat scenarios or unwanted incidents
not directly associated with an asset in the diagrams, hence requiring some kind
of computing of the likelihoods, the risk analysis team may apply "an informal
method that is quite straight forward and transparent and suitable for the brainstorming
setting" [11].
2.3.3 Semantics
A textual syntax and a structured semantics for the CORAS diagrams is precisely
defined in Structured semantics for the CORAS security risk modelling language [14]
or the CORAS semantics for short. The work is intended to enable users of the
CORAS language to easily extract the precise meaning of a CORAS diagram. Al-
though all five CORAS diagrams are handled in detail in the CORAS semantics,
we only focus on the threat diagram because of the scope of the SCORE project.
Below we reproduce what is relevant to the SCORE project from the CORAS
semantics using the same outline as the original work.
Threat diagrams
A threat diagram presents a chain of events initiated by threats that end up in
an unwanted incident. The unwanted events occur due to vulnerabilities. How this
occurs is described by so-called threat scenarios. When an unwanted incident
occurs, it may have consequence for the assets. Threat diagrams may apply the
following constructs from 2.3.1 above: deliberate, accidental and non-human
threats, vulnerabilities, threat scenarios, unwanted incidents, and assets, and the
relations: initiate and impact. Threat scenarios and unwanted incidents may be
assigned a likelihood value.
There are clearly defined rules for how the relations may be used and which
22 CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
elements are involved. First of all, they are all binary and directed. The impact
relationship may only be used to relate an unwanted incident to an asset that is
harmed as a consequence of this incident. Impact relationships may be assigned
a consequence value. An initiate relationship applies to all the constructs except
the asset, but not to all possible combinations. A threat diagram is always
initiated by a threat that exploits vulnerability, either directly to an unwanted
incident or through a threat scenario. The two latter may further initiate other
threat scenarios or unwanted incidents. Initiate relationships may be assigned a
likelihood value.
Translation from graphical to textual syntax
The CORAS semantics defines translation rules for all possible relations. Here
we present the scenario where a threat scenario initiates an unwanted incident
(figure 2.5), and because the other scenarios are analogues we believe that they
are easy to picture for the reader. The arrow →˜ denotes the transformation from
graphical to textual syntax.
ts ( l1 )
V 1 l 3
ui ( l2 )
~
Figure 2.5: Graphical to textual translation of a threat scenario to unwanted
incident initiate relationship
Structured semantics for threat diagrams
Following up the example from above, we present: Initiate relation, threat scenario
to unwanted incident from the CORAS semantics:
~ts(l1)→ ui(l2) := After ~ts(l1) has taken place, ~ui(l2) may be initiated
~ts(l1)
l3→ ui(l2) := After ~ts has taken place, there is a ~l3 that ~ui(l2) will be initiated
~ts(l1)
Vn→ ui(l2) := After ~ts has taken place, ~Vn may be exploited to initiate ~ui(l2)
~ts(l1)
Vnl3→ ui(l2) := After ~ts has taken place, there is a ~l that ~Vn will be exploited
to initiate ~ui(l2)
And with the threat scenario and unwanted incident from above defined as:
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~ts(l1) := threat scenario ’ts’, which has likelihood ’l1’




In this chapter we conduct a problem analysis for the SCORE project. The main
purpose of the chapter is to characterise a problem description which the rest of
the thesis will investigate. The first thing we describe in this chapter is a case
study conducted with the purpose of analysing our domain of interest. The case
study is an industrial CORAS security risk analysis from which experiences are
utilised to obtain a problem characterisation. With the problem characterisation
in hand, we investigate what are the possible theoretical approaches to our
problem description and relate the background material provided in chapter 2
to the SCORE project and its problem description. Next we decide a research
method that appoints the further progress of the SCORE project and assures that
it follows acknowledged research processes. Based on all of the above, we finally
come up with the success criteria for the SCORE project.
3.1 Aim of the problem analysis
The problem analysis is written to clarify what are the specific tasks for the
project. In order to come up with useful results the problem analysis must
identify the needs for the SCORE project that also yields the motivation for
executing the project.
The result of the problem analysis should be a precise and accurate characteri-
sation of the success criteria for the SCORE project. The success criteria are later
used to verify whether or to what extent the SCORE project meets its require-
ments and fulfils its tasks.
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Achievement of success is accomplished through certain methods of research
and studies. The problem analysis should also describe suitable methodologies
and identify what information is needed from which information sources.
3.2 Case study
The SECURIS project is an EU-funded project that builds, amongst others, on
results from the completed research project CORAS and aims to establish a com-
puterised method for the development of secure IT systems. The eight SECURIS
field trial [4] is used as a case study to identify the needs and requirements for
the SCORE project. Experiences and recommendations from the risk analysis
team are documented in an own evaluation report [4]. We examine the risk esti-
mation phase section of the report with particular interest below and reproduce
the interesting findings.
From the section explaining the practical conduction of the risk estimation phase,
we extract the following information:
The risk analysis team aimed to assign frequency values directly to the un-
wanted incidents harming an asset. Due to the complex nature of some of the
unwanted incidents, the participants had to estimate values for the simpler
threat scenarios or other unwanted incidents and use this information to
make a roughly estimated frequency value.
The above is accompanied with the following recommendation from the risk
analysis team:
When the participants have problems estimating the frequency value of an
unwanted incident, the risk analysis team should try to focus on the related
threat scenarios of less complexity and use this information to estimate the
combined frequency value.
The problems stated above could be solved with a method for estimating the
likelihood (here: frequency) values at the threat scenario level with the intention
of aggregating a combined likelihood value for the unwanted incident based on
the threat scenario input. The SCORE method should aim to offer such a feature.
From the evaluation report we find more valuable information, now concerning
the live conduction of the risk analysis and how clear and easy-to-understand
the risk estimation phase and diagrams appear:
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On complex diagrams with multiple paths towards an asset there was con-
fusion of what was focus at the present moment.
And the evaluation report further recommends on basis of the experiences:
The risk analysis team recommends using the CORAS tool live during the
risk analysis workshops with well prepared diagrams. To provide the best
overview and easy to follow diagrams, they should be kept small enough for
a single projected screen size, but yet in context to retain proper overview.
This implies that the phase of risk estimation may be confusing to the risk analysis
participants. We believe that the SCORE tool designed to simplify how risk
estimation documentation is retrieved and processed and with the possibility to
extract one single path from the rest of the diagram, would help the participants
getting a more perspicuous overview of the risk estimation phase.
3.3 Problem characterisation
The problem characterisation consists of three coherent parts: an overall problem
description, a motivation and a refined problem characterisation. The first section
defines an overall hypothesis we wish to investigate in this thesis. Next we
motivate our choice of problem area and explain the needs related to the current
research area. Finally we refine the overall hypothesis into predictions that can
be used for validation.
3.3.1 Overall problem description
Our research is subject to the field of technology research (which is explained and
motivated in section 3.5) and will therefore yield an overall hypothesis proposing
the statement: an artefact satisfying a need [15]. The artefact this that respect, is
the SCORE tool-supported method.
Overall hypothesis
H1: a carefully designed tool-supported method will increase the efficiency of risk
estimation using CORAS diagrams
CORAS diagrams do currently not possess any structured methodical way to
support the risk estimation phase of a CORAS risk analysis. Risk estimation
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is dealt with in a manual matter left up to the field experts. If we apply a
tool-supported method to this phase, we believe that the conduction of the risk
estimation phase will perform easier and the results become more accurate. In
order to investigate efficiency, we need to look at both effectiveness in a time
related fashion and correctness related to the result of likelihood calculations.
Our hypothesis immediately raises two questions: How can risk estimation be
automated with a computerised tool? What rules shall such method build on? In
prolongation to the overall question we will investigate if and possibly how the
established techniques from chapter 2 may be applied to CORAS diagrams in
order to answer the questions.
3.3.2 Motivation
Our problem description is mainly motivated by the need we reveal for our
artefact in section 3.2. The study shows that the problem is highly relevant be-
cause it may cause unnecessary confusion during a risk analysis [4] (examined
in section 3.2 of this chapter). Although the problem has obviously been ad-
dressed previously in the research of CORAS diagrams, no formal method has
yet been evolved. We believe that the SCORE tool-supported method contribute
to CORAS by increasing the efficiency of CORAS risk estimation.
In a scientific research relation, our problem has proven to be of great interest.
CORAS as a research project has demonstrated scientific significance and top-
icality by being an EU-funded research project (completed in September 2003)
[16] in the first place. The fact that CORAS is followed up by SECURIS [17] the
next year (also EU-funded) that in turn is succeeded by DIGIT [18] this year that
both continue pursue the development of CORAS, consolidates the scientific
significance of CORAS.
Furthermore, problems about decision making methods based on fuzzy or qual-
itative data (as we experience during risk estimation of CORAS risk analysis)
has proven to be of scientific interest by a number of scientists and their work
[19][20][21].
3.3.3 Refined problem description
In order to be able to test the overall hypothesis H1, it needs to be refined into
a set of specialised predictions that assemble the overall success criteria for the
SCORE project. The predictions constitutes the basis for the hypothesis testing,
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hence they need to be expressed in such a way that they are easily rejectable
(falsification).
Before we propose the predictions we need to explain a complicated but rather
important (in terms of hypothesis testing) phrase from H1, namely increased
efficiency. Increase is defined as addition or enlargement in size, extent, or
quantity [22] while efficiency considers effectiveness in terms of time-saving and
added quality in our context.
In order for a risk estimation to become more accurate with respect to the like-
lihood values, we must compare it to what is the current situation. CORAS
diagram pragmatics (section 2.3.2) proves that all estimations of likelihoods are
performed using human expertise and experience. Weaknesses from thence are
related to human limitations such as dealing with large or complicated data and
intricate relations. Probability theories prove that humans have the tendency
to overestimate the likelihood of conjunctive events, and especially when the
events are complex or compound [23], as CORAS unwanted incidents may be.
In order for a tool-supported method to improve this method and deal with the
problem, it must fulfil the overall success criteria we claim as predictions below.
These will be further specialised into detailed success criteria at the end of this
chapter.
A carefully designed tool-supported method:
Overall success criterion 1
P1: will provide the ability to merely assign likelihood values to threat scenarios and
automate likelihood aggregation to unwanted incidents
Overall success criterion 2
P2: will be able to calculate likelihood values for diagram elements initiated through
intricate relations
Overall success criterion 3
P3: will handle an arbitrary large number of input
When concerning effectiveness in terms of time-saving, the tool-supported method
should apply means to what type of input to process.
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Overall success criterion 4
P4: will provide the ability to merely deal with qualitative data, but still yield
calculations thereupon
Overall success criterion 5
P5: will provide the ability to merely assign likelihood values to threat scenarios and
automate likelihood aggregation to unwanted incidents
3.4 Discussion
In this section we discuss whether, or to what extent, the analysis techniques
described in chapter 2 can be performed with CORAS diagrams. First we eval-
uate the analysis techniques FTA, ETA and ATA against CORAS diagrams, and
based on this follows a description on how to develop the SCORE tool-supported
method for risk estimation.
When we talk about CORAS diagrams in this chapter, we refer to CORAS threat
diagrams exclusively.
3.4.1 Established modelling techniques and the needs of CORAS
diagrams
The main problem to be addressed here is if and possibly how the established
analysis techniques (fault tree, event tree and attack tree analysis from chapter
2) can be conducted using CORAS diagrams.
The attack tree is not discussed alone, but is considered as a specialisation of the
more general fault tree. Their syntax is similar, but the attack tree specifically
turns upon security of computer systems. Since SCORE concerns analysis of
computer systems, it would be more appropriate to consider the attack tree
analysis as the variant of performing a fault tree analysis. We therefore refer to
the fault and attack tree analysis as one but use the fault tree notation due to its
common industrial application, hereby FTA.
FTA is heavily incorporated in industrial risk analyses and has ever since the orig-
inal development of CORAS been a contemplated part of its framework [16]. The
intention was that CORAS diagrams can be used to construct fault trees. ETA is
mentioned in the manual for the CORAS methodology [24] found in the CORAS
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tool as an example of conventional risk analysis methods that could possibly
attend a risk analysis together with Hazard and Operability Analysis (HazOp)
[6], Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Anal-
ysis (FMECA) [6]. Although the the CORAS methodology manual is currently
outdated (refer to [13] instead), Hogganvik and Stølen claim FTA, ATA and ETA
to be supported in their graphical approach [25] originated from the CORAS
project, thus should be facilitated by the CORAS tool. HazOp and FMECA are
beyond the scope of this report, but FTA and ETA are discussed exhaustively
later.
Fault trees and event trees both have a similar, yet different, characteristic to-
gether with CORAS diagrams. Threat diagrams [13] have a much similar struc-
ture to fault trees. An unwanted incident (or even a threat scenario in some
cases) can be thought of as the top event of a fault tree with a random number
of threat scenarios describing how the unwanted incident may occur. CORAS
diagrams starts with a threat as the top event which is the leaf node in a fault tree,
hence they grow in opposite directions. Event trees however, concur to CORAS
diagrams with respect to reading direction. They start with an initiating event
that could be some identified threat, and follows the chain of events leading to
the accident (or unwanted incident). Below we look into each of them in detail.
FTA in CORAS diagrams
To create a fault tree we need to identify the unwanted incident as the top event.
Then we can successively construct the tree by identifying possible incidents that
may cause the top event. When all incidents are identified, we see the actual use
for this technique. Likelihood values may be assigned to each of them yielding:
after incident A has taken place, there is a likelihood l that incident B will
be initiated
where A and B are nodes in the tree and l is assigned the relation between them.
With likelihood values assigned to a minimal cut-set (refer to chapter 2.2.1) or
more of the incidents, the fault tree aggregates the likelihood up to the top event.
To perform an FTA in a CORAS diagram we would choose an unwanted incident
(or a threat scenario) to represent the top event we wish to investigate. We say
"or a threat scenario" because we could just as well investigate a threat scenario
as an unwanted incident even though the latter are most common and what we
aim for in the end. The initiating threat scenarios (or unwanted incidents) can
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easily be translated into the internal nodes of the fault tree as the children of the
top event. Again; unwanted incidents in parenthesis means that they could also
be the initiator though this is more seldom.
When it comes to selecting the leaf nodes for the fault tree, the CORAS elements
are not merely intuitive. An FTA defines the leaf nodes as the initiating events
which would imply using the threats from CORAS diagrams. Fault trees need
to assign likelihood values to the relations from the leaf nodes as input for the
likelihood calculation. This ability is documented in the CORAS semantics [14]
and yields to all initiating relationships, including those from threats. However,
this is not best practise from CORAS risk analyses where we normally applies
likelihood values to the first threat scenarios initiated by the threats.
Allowed mappings:
FTA CORAS diagram
root threat scenario unwanted incident
intermediate threat scenario unwanted incident
leaf threat threat scenario unwanted incident
Table 3.1: Mappings from fault tree to CORAS diagram
where the preferred (and most intuitive) CORAS elements to their respective
tree construct are in boldface.
The missing FTA constructs we have not discussed yet are the logical ports AND
and OR. The CORAS semantics does not define the logical ports as a part of the
language even though we have presented them as a part of the CORAS constructs
in chapter 2.3. If we look into an initiate relationship and picture two or more
initiating nodes, we are likely to interpret them as independent when nothing
else is claimed. Given this assumption, we would calculate the likelihood values
using an OR port.
Otherwise, if we must expect dependencies between nodes, this should be ex-
plicitly illustrated using the AND port. Note that use of the AND port should be
deliberate and denote the situation where all input nodes (to the AND port) are
interrelated and must happen before in order for the subsequent to be initiated.
The likelihood of the latter would hence be the likelihood for this to occur [26].
Other possible more diffuse dependencies would most certainly affect possible
likelihood calculations and require research in special fields of dependability,
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thus fall outside of the scope of the SCORE method.
ETA in CORAS diagrams
An event tree presents a dynamic view of a scenario caused by an initiating
event leading to an accident. A CORAS diagram would be able to capture the
sequential event-flow if we apply a threat or vulnerability as the top event of
the event tree and an unwanted incident as the accident. Similar to the previous
discussion on FTA, the flexibility of the CORAS elements allows us to model
different elements as different nodes, but clear preferences from the CORAS risk
analysis method yield the boldface ones.
Allowed mappings are:
ETA CORAS diagram
root threat threat scenario unwanted incident
intermediate threat scenario unwanted incident
leaf threat scenario unwanted incident
Table 3.2: Mappings from event tree to CORAS diagram
where the preferred (and most intuitive) CORAS elements to their respective
tree construct are in boldface.
Similar to fault trees also event trees have some differences from CORAS dia-
grams. First of all event trees do not allow more than one root node. Secondly
there are no (binary) constructs for success or failure. However, CORAS diagrams
have likelihood values for the relationships to each node defined as the likeli-
hood for the node to initiate another. In such manner, the ETA success would
mean likelihood 1 and failure 0.
3.4.2 Developing the SCORE method for risk estimation
When we develop our method there are several aspects we need to consider
in addition to the mappings we have suggested above from the established
modelling techniques. First of all we need to relate the techniques to both a
quantitative and a qualitative approach. Fault trees have clearly defined rules
for how to calculate the likelihood values according to the composition of the
node’s children and their relations through either logical AND or OR ports.
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CORAS diagrams should define unique rules for every possible relation in a
similar fashion used in FTA.
More problems arise when we only have qualitative data as input. Therefore
we need to create intervals for the qualitative information and categorise the
statements. Further, specially designed rules to deal with intervals must be
defined explicitly.
Another aspect related to qualitative input is how to handle such from an ar-
bitrary number of sources. Multiple statements may support or contradict one
another. Supporting statements would get a more reliable assertion the more
statements we gain. If the multiple statements spreads out or contradicts each
other, we may possibly create intervals in which the assertion is likely to be
true. The question is whether or not to employ this information into the CORAS
diagrams. This could be accomplished with a reliability value following each
node in the tree, or the value could be baked into the already existing probability
value. More likely would be to apply theories for multiple criteria decision mak-
ing for fuzzy data [19], and the benefit would be that one single statement could
not possibly bias the result. The drawback is that we may not have a sufficiently
large number of statements available to make a certain statement do impact on
the result and the complexity of such method would be tremendous.
3.4.3 Developing the SCORE tool supporting the SCORE method
The SCORE tool must be developed with the main objective being to support
the SCORE method. This means that the tool must automate the risk estimation
calculations defined in the SCORE method. This in turn implies that the tool
must provide an interface to collect the risk estimation data. Both quantitative
and qualitative input must be accounted for and processed accordingly. All rules
that the method provides should be supported.
During risk estimation in a CORAS risk analysis the CORAS tool is often used
live at the risk identification workshop [13]. The tool may be projected on a white-
board or equivalent for the risk analysis participants to follow and perform the
risk modelling on-the-fly. In most cases the CORAS tool and computerised mod-
elling tools in general are unfamiliar to the participants on the client side. Much
research has been put into the development of CORAS to make the execution
perform as efficiently as possible [25] both with respect to method and tool. The
SCORE tool should of course aim to continue pursue this mentality. Motivated
by this, we believe that the SCORE tool shall be integrated with the existing
CORAS tool as much as possible. If it acts as a stand-alone module working in
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parallel with the CORAS tool instead, it could possibly result in extra confusion
for the risk analysis participants.
Software development may be an endless process; functionality and usability
features may be added and/or improved and user requests may exceed all rea-
sonable limits given the available resources. The purpose for the SCORE tool
implementation is to develop a functional prototype that provides enough func-
tionality that are required for validation of the SCORE method and tool [15].
What is enough functionality is defined in the success criteria (section 3.6) based
on the discussion here and above. However, a full requirement specification
document (provided in appendix B) should be developed for eventual further
implementation of the SCORE tool.
3.5 Research strategy
This section explains how the SCORE project is conducted in practise and what
type of research strategy the project follows throughout its life. First we intro-
duce a formal procedure for technology research [15] with a particular interest
in software engineering [27]. Then we argue the concerns for SCORE before
proposing the selected research strategy.
The SCORE project will develop both a theoretical method and a computer
software prototype. In that concern, this type of research belongs to the special
field of technology research further specialised as software engineering and is subject
to certain practises and guidelines.
3.5.1 Software engineering and technology research
Technology research is motivated by the need for developing a new or improving
an existing artefact. The artefact in this case would be the SCORE tool-supported
method containing both a method for risk estimation and the computerised tool
supporting this. The need for the artefact is substantiated through a problem
analysis by acquiring requests and requirements for the artefact from existing
users based on field trial(s). The requirements constitute the basis for a set of
success criteria upon which the realised artefact will be evaluated.
After the success criteria are created, the project moves into an innovative phase.
The SCORE project needs both to come up with a new method for risk estimation
using CORAS diagrams and to improve the existing version of the CORAS tool
by adding a new module. Both parts are executed more or less in parallel and
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follow a similar research strategy. This includes using the common practises for
software engineering.
A peculiar characteristic for software engineering is the influence of human
behaviour through the people developing software [27]. The SCORE project
should therefore employ some of the methods for empirical research together
with theoretical research strategies (described in section 3.5.2 below). The aim
of the innovative phase is to develop an artefact that fulfils the success criteria.
In software engineering this means to first create the requirements specifications
based on the result of the problem analysis. Good and detailed specifications
simplify the implementation of the system.
To prove that the artefact fulfils the requirements the system is evaluated with
respect to the success criteria. In software engineering this process commences
preferably already during requirements engineering designated as an iterative
process. The SCORE project should result in a prototype possessing enough
functionality for evaluation. In order to conduct a complete evaluation, the
evaluation techniques should cover as much characteristics of the system as
possible. These are proposed below.
3.5.2 Research strategy techniques
When gathering research evidence, we try to maximise three characteristics:
generalisability, precision and realism. In formal technology research there exists
certain strategies, but none of them covers all characteristics. The contingency
is to choose multiple techniques that complement each other [15]. We base our
selection on McGrath’s eight defined research strategies [28]. The SCORE project
should employ:
Initial case study – this is an initial field trial of the existing CORAS tool used
in an industrial security risk analysis to identify the requirements for the
SCORE tool-supported method.
Non-empirical evidence – this is the general theoretic research strategy for mod-
elling the universal behaviour of the system. In SCORE we refer to the
formal argumentation in creating the method for risk estimation together
with a theoretical walk-through of the method’s underlying theories.
Laboratory experiment – an experimental study of the working system with
purpose to manipulate desired variables to possibly provoke unexpected
behaviour[27].
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Experimental simulation – the SCORE tool-supported method should be tested
on a real security risk analysis with emphasis on the risk estimation phase
as a test case.
The chosen techniques fulfil the three characteristics: non-empirical evidence ap-
plies generalisability, but lacks precision where laboratory experiment on the con-
trary covers fully up. An experimental simulation covers the missing one – realism.
3.6 Detailed success criteria
The success criteria assemble our expectations for the SCORE project and are
used to validate the results of the project in chapter 7.
3.6.1 Success criteria for the SCORE method
The SCORE method shall: provide rules that defines the risk estimation calcu-
lations in CORAS diagrams
1. define rules for likelihood calculations on 1-to-1 initiate relationships
- calculation of numerical values shall be supported
- calculation of qualitative values shall be supported
2. define rules for likelihood calculations on many-to-1 initiate relationships
- calculation of numerical values shall be supported
- calculation of qualitative values shall be supported
3. define how to translate qualitative values into numerical sets applicable
for likelihood calculations
4. define rules for dealing with inconsistencies
3.6.2 Success criteria for the SCORE tool
The SCORE tool shall: provide a tool-support for the SCORE method
1. provide the ability to assign likelihood values to threat scenarios
- both numerical and qualitative values shall be available to be assigned
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- the likelihood values shall be stored in the unique node
2. provide the ability to assign likelihood values to unwanted incidents
- both numerical and qualitative values shall be available to be assigned
- the likelihood values shall be stored in the unique node
3. provide the ability to assign likelihood values to initiate relationships
- the likelihood values shall be probability values in the range [0-1]
- the likelihood values shall be stored in the unique relationship
4. provide the ability to assign consequence values to harm relationships
5. automatically calculate possible likelihood values according to the SCORE
method
- the tool shall perform a test to validate that sufficient input data is
available upon execution
- the tool shall keep the exact calculated values for further calculations
in cases of round-offs and translation between numerical and qualita-
tive values
6. provide an overview of the properties of the diagram elements
3.6.3 Success criteria for the SCORE tool-supported method inte-
grated with CORAS
The SCORE tool-supported method shall: be integrated with CORAS
1. apply to CORAS diagrams
- the tool-supported method shall apply to the risk estimation phase
and threat diagrams in special
2. be integrated with the CORAS tool
All of the detailed success criteria defined above originates from the overall
success criteria defined under the problem characterisation in section 3.3.3. The
latter depends on the detailed success criteria to be validated in order to be
validated themselves; and consequently a complete validation of the detailed
success criteria hence implies validation of the overall correspondingly.
Chapter 4
The SCORE method
The risk estimation phase of a CORAS security risk analysis is performed with
very much of the estimation work left open to the risk analysis participants.
They have total freedom in assigning likelihood values to threat scenarios and
unwanted incidents in a subjective manner, regardless of current dependencies
or previously defined estimation levels. This may lead to inconsistencies in the
CORAS diagrams and to estimated risk levels that do not account for history or
external influence.
The SCORE method aims to structure the risk estimation process and provide
a defined risk estimation method constituted of a set of rules. By standardising
and automating the method, the SCORE method will provide the risk estima-
tion activity sufficient overview to avoid confusion about how to estimate an
appropriate risk level for a composite diagram element.
The SCORE method bases its work first of all on the CORAS semantics [14] that
defines the language of CORAS diagrams. To come up with the rules, known
techniques for Probability theory [29] and Set theory [29] have been used.
This chapter describes the SCORE method. First we present an example model
that will be used for exemplification throughout the chapter. When we present
the rules that constitute the method, we distinguish cases dealing with quanti-
tative data from qualitative. We handle the quantitative rules first due to their
precise nature and base the qualitative rules on the quantitative ones.
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4.1 Legend
Figure 4.1 describes an example scenario that we use to demonstrate the SCORE
method as we define the different rules.
Figure 4.1: Example model for the SCORE method
To make the rules that may have a rather mathematical appearance easier to
follow, the reader should be aware of the following notation:
Syntactic variables:
• ts – threat scenario
• ui – unwanted incident
• l – likelihood value (l ∈ {0, 1}) – used for annotating a node with probability
• p – probability value (p ∈ {0, 1}) – used for annotating a relationship with
probability
• n, m – node n in the CORAS diagram, also called a diagram element
• i,j,k,m – incremental counters
Note the difference in role between the syntactic variables l and p, both ranging
over probabilities. We use this convention to improve readability.
Operators:
• P() – "Power set" operator; the set of all subsets
• L() – Probabilistic domain definition
• U() – Linguistic domain definition
• sup – "Supremum" or least upper bound of a set
• inf – "Infimum" or greatest lower bound of a set
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Vulnerabilities may be a part of any relation handled, but are omitted in this
chapter since they bring no extra information to the calculation of likelihoods.
All rules in this section are presented using a simple frame consisting of two
compartments and a header. The second compartment defines the rule itself
based on the assumptions stated in compartment one. After the rule follows
the application domain, which defines what other relationships or situations
the rule applies to. Finally the rule is demonstrated with an example from the
figure 4.1 above where we apply a pattern matching of the current rule elements
respective to the relevant diagram notations. In other words: we substitute the
rule elements with the appropriate diagram elements, and we use an arrow→,
not to be confused with the one used in the rules, to declare this.
The rules defined in this chapter apply only to initiate relationships. Still the
relations from a threat or relationships initiated by a threat are exceptions from
the rules since the CORAS semantics does not allow a threat to be assigned a
likelihood value.
4.2 Quantitative rules
The first set of rules is given on the basis of exact quantitative input of probability
estimations.
4.2.1 1-to-1 complete relationships
The simplest form of relationship is the 1-to-1 relationship between two diagram
elements. To calculate the likelihood value of the initiated element, we apply the
rule:






l = l1 × p
Given the likelihood value l1 of the initiating element n1 and the probability p
for n1 to initiate n, we may calculate the likelihood l of n with l = l1 × p. This
can be done by applying probability theory of independent events that allows us to
multiply the probability and likelihood value with the desired likelihood value
as result.










Consider the relation between B and A from figure 4.1 as an example of how the





a = b × 1
The likelihood value a is then calculated from b and 1 multiplied.
4.2.2 Many-to-1 complete relationships
When m ≥ 2 elements (may) initiate an element m+1, we say we have a many-to-1
complete relationship where we calculate the combined likelihood value according
to the rule:












l = (l1 × p1) + . . . + (lm × pm)
As long as we assume all the elements n1 − nm to be independent, the combined
likelihood value l of nm+1 is calculated as a sum of all contributions from the
initiate relationships initiated by n1 − nm.










Consider the unwanted incident A with an arbitrary number of threat scenarios








a = (b × 1) + . . . + (c × 2)
4.2.3 Incomplete relationships
When dealing with risk assessment, we may not capture the whole risk picture;
hence there may be unknown incidents we have not taken into account. The
following rule aims to account for unknown causes of diagram element n:






l ≥ (l1 × p)
When we account for possible unknown scenarios initiating n, we introduce the
inequality. Similar situation applies for the many-to-1 scenario:
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l ≥ (l1 × p1) + . . . + (lm × pm)
The application domain for both preceding rules is the same as the corresponding
rules for completeness (rule 4.2.1 and 4.2.2).
4.2.4 1-to-1 complete paths
This rule defines the least set of required values for li and pi in order to calculate
l.
[1 − to − 1 complete path]
0 ≤ i ≤ m
n0(l0)
p0→ n1 p1→ . . . pm−2→ nm−1 pm−1→ nm
n0(l0)
p0→ n1(l1) p1→ . . . pm−2→ nm−1(lm−1) pm−1→ nm(l)
where
li+1 = (li × pi)
l = l0 × p0 × p1 × . . . × pm−1
Yields the following least set required (LSR) rule with respect to li and pi in order
to calculate l:
[Least set required (LSR)]
{l0}
{p0, p1, . . . , pm−1}
Given a l0, we only need the set p0 − pm−1 (i.e. no other values for li required) in
order to calculate l.
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Application domain
ts1(li)
pi→ . . . pm−1→ tsm(l)
ts(li)
pi→ . . . pm−1→ ui(l)
ui(li)
pi→ . . . pm−1→ ts(l)
uii(li)
pi→ . . . pm−1→ uim(l)
The example below considers any sequence of elements ts or ui, or both combined






a = (e × 7) × 2
4.3 Qualitative rules
When performing a security risk analysis, the analysis participants may find
it easier to operate with qualitative terms for likelihood estimations than exact
quantitative numbers. In order to perform the calculations from the previous
section (4.2), we need to map the qualitative values to intervals. Hence, we also
need to start off by making rules for how to summarise and multiply intervals
and apply these to our findings from the quantitative rules. The probabilistic
intervals in turn are defined below as sets ranging from 0 to 1.
4.3.1 Defining a set
The SCORE method defines an interval as a set of probability values. The set
ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 means will not happen and 1 means will happen. We
define our type pm with the power set operator of the set S which is the set of all
subsets:




P(S) def= {T | T ⊆ S ∧ T , ∅}
Using the power set we can easily define a probabilistic domain with values




L def= P[0 . . . 1]





U def= {l ∈ P(L) | ∀ i, j ∈ l : i ∩ j , ∅⇒ j = i ∧⋃i∈l i = [0 . . . 1]}
meaning that every distinct linguistic expression is unique (i.e. no overlap) and
their total union constitute the full probabilistic domain [0 . . . 1].
4.3.2 Set multiplication
This rule defines multiplication of two or more sets. Set multiplication is asso-
ciative the same way as normal multiplication and therefore we only need to
define multiplication of two sets and not an arbitrary number of sets.
[Set multiplication]
p1, p2 : P([0, . . . , 1])
p1 × p2 def= {t1 × t2 | t1 ∈ p1 ∧ t2 ∈ p2}
The rule yields that multiplication of two sets results in a new set where all
containing elements are calculations of each of the set elements multiplied by
each of the other set elements.
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4.3.3 Set addition
This rule defines addition of two or more sets. Set addition is associative the
same way as normal addition and therefore we only need to define addition of
two sets and not an arbitrary number of sets.
[Set addition :]
p1, p2 : P([0, . . . , 1])
p1 + p2
def
= {t1 + t2 | t1 ∈ p1 ∧ t2 ∈ p2} ∩ [0, . . . , 1]
The rule yields that addition of two sets results in a new set where all containing
elements are calculations of each of the set elements added by each of the other
set elements. However we must take into consideration that the calculated set
may reach beyond its upper limit 1 and round off to 1.
4.3.4 Selecting the correct interval
Below we define a rule that yields the correct behaviour of interval selection in
scenarios where a calculated likelihood set i needs to be mapped to a linguistic
variable. P are the predefined legal intervals.
[Interval selection]
P :U
i : P[0 . . . 1]
i  P def= p where p ∈ P ∧ sup(i)−inf (i)2 ∈ p
4.3.5 Inconsistencies
When a diagram element occurs in different diagrams or in different, indepen-
dent places in the same diagram, it may lead to inconsistencies with respect to the
likelihood values. If all likelihood values for the initiated element are calculated
automatically, we get the following rule:






















pi1→ . . .
piki→ m(⋃ij=1 lj)
This can be compared with a normal 1-to-many situation (section 4.2.2) and the
likelihoods are simply summarised. On the other hand, when one or more of












pi1→ . . .
piki→ m(li)










pi1→ . . .
piki→ m(⋂ij=1 lj)
Since we rely more to expert judgements than calculated values, the manual
values shall be weighted more significance while curtailing the sample space
of [l1 − li]. However, the expert judgements may be vague, and the calculated
values being the reducing factor. In both situations we use the intersection to
define the combined likelihood value.
Chapter 5
Requirements for the tool
IT-projects most often start with the client and the contractor agreeing on what
shall be the delivery of the project. In system development projects the two
parties normally come up with a detailed software requirements specification
(SRS) document that forms a special type of contract. The SRS is used as a tool
for the contractor during the system development as an instruction for what to
develop. However, after delivery the client may use the SRS to ensure that the
system fulfils its mission. Likewise in the SCORE project; we use the SRS to
specify the SCORE tool and to compare the tool and the SRS in the evaluation
phase.
The first part of this chapter introduces an overall vision of the tool and moti-
vates the needs for the tool. This can be read by anyone. Next we present the
requirements for the tool which are addressed to readers with experiences from
requirements engineering or detailed knowledge of the CORAS tool.
5.1 The vision
The overall aim for the tool is to support the SCORE method through a com-
puterised user interface. The interface provides the user with a simple way
to collect risk estimation data and automatically processes it according to the
method. Figure 5.1 shows what the interface looks like, and those already famil-
iar with the already existing CORAS tool will see that the SCORE tool is in fact
simply an extension of this, because the only visual evidence of the SCORE tool
is the bottom tabbed panel containing the property view amongst others.
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Figure 5.1: The SCORE tool interface
Furthermore, the tool helps the risk analysis leader to communicate with the
risk analysis participants and to collaborate with the risk analysis secretary. The
risk analysis participants will experience that it is easier to relate to the scenarios
under evaluation since they only need to concentrate on the lower level threat
scenarios instead of the composite unwanted incidents.
5.1.1 Purpose
The SCORE tool aims to provide a user interface in the CORAS tool for the risk
analysts to simplify the process of risk estimation, meaning that the tool serves
the purpose of:
• providing an interface for the analysts to document risk estimations based
on expert judgements
• automating risk estimation calculations (on-the-fly) based on the SCORE
method (chapter 4)
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• providing an overview of the properties of the current element of interest
• providing warnings when inconsistencies with respect to risk estimations
occur
• automatically importing predefined estimation values from the CORAS
tool
• allowing the analysts to choose legal estimation values as input
In the next section we describe how the tool implements the defined method
from chapter 4 to accommodate the requirements for automated risk estimation
calculations.
5.2 Software requirements
Software requirements engineering is an important phase in a software develop-
ment life cycle [30]. Normally in an industrial setting, a requirements document
would act as a contract between the customer and the developer(s) where the
delivery in detail is specified. In this report the requirements act as success
criteria upon which the final results are evaluated (conducted in chapter 7). The
requirements are nevertheless important for the system thus been developed as
an own Software Requirements Specification (SRS) document in appendix B. Be-
low we present the main concepts of this document, and where the SRS uses
precise textual notion for implementation detail accuracy, we introduce use case
diagrams and graphical models in addition for clear and simple perception.
5.2.1 User requirements
The user requirements concerns legal operations the users can execute. They are
presented in terms of a use case diagram (figure 5.2) followed by a short textual
description for each of them.
Users
The actor from figure 5.2 is defined as the user of the CORAS tool:
Risk analysis secretary - The user of the CORAS tool
A CORAS risk analysis entitles two roles (at least, there could preferably with
available resources present be more) where one is to be the risk analysis secretary.
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Figure 5.2: Use case diagram
The secretary’s responsibility involves using the CORAS tool to document the
risk analysis both live at the risk workshops and editing before and after.
Use cases
UC-1 - Select single node
UC-2 - Select edge
UC-3 - Select multiple diagram elements
UC-4 - Assign likelihood value
UC-5 - Assign consequence value
UC-6 - Calculate likelihood value
UC-7 - Import likelihood values
UC-8 - Import consequence values
The first three use cases (UC-1, UC-2 and UC-3) deal with the simple action of
selecting or highlighting a diagram element (in other words: the element gains
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focus/marquee selection). The response of the use cases is that the tool shows the
appropriate properties for the selected element(s) with its respective features.
These features are the assignment of likelihood or consequence values – use
cases UC-4 and UC-5 that are made available through the same property view.
UC-6, calculate likelihood value, is available once likelihood values have been
assigned. Finally we have the import use cases UC-7 and UC-8 that allows the
user to import predefined likelihood or consequence values from the CORAS
tool.
5.2.2 System requirements
Given the required use cases as starting point we establish the system require-
ments through low-level detailed and textual specifications concerning the tech-
nical aspects of the system. The SRS (appendix B) provides a detailed examina-
tion of the system requirements, and below we present the summary of the most
central requirements.
The SCORE tool shall:
SR-1 - provide a pane for the various risk estimation functions containing a
property view, path view, problem view, likelihood view and a consequence view
SR-2 - display properties in the property view when a single node is selected
The properties are:
• type – the element type
• body – content of the element
• likelihood – the element’s assigned likelihood value
• consequence – the element’s assigned consequence value
SR-3 - display properties in the property view when an edge is selected The
properties are:
• type – the edge type
• likelihood – the edge’s assigned likelihood value
• source – the initiating element
• target – the initiated element
SR-4 - display selected path in the path view when multiple nodes are selected
SR-5 - allow for likelihood values to be assigned to a node or edge when selected
SR-6 - allow for consequence values to be assigned to a harm edge when selected
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SR-7 - automatically calculate likelihood on assignment or changes in likelihood
values
System requirement 1 (SR-1) declares a panel in the CORAS tool that is the most
conspicuous visual result of the SCORE tool. The pane consists of different tabs,
and the two following requirements SR-2 and SR-3 describes functionality for
one of them, the property view. SR-4 deals with the path view while the last three
requirements describes features related to functionality. SR-5 and SR-6 considers
assignment of likelihood and consequences respectively while SR-7 defines the
core likelihood calculation of estimated values.
Chapter 6
The SCORE tool
One of the two main results from the SCORE project is the computerised tool
that supports the method for risk estimation. The SCORE tool application will
be available at [31] for a limited period. Here we present the implementation of
this. When we talk about the computerised tool in this chapter, we use the notion
the SCORE tool or simply the tool. Note that this should not be confused with the
original CORAS tool which this tool is an implemented part of. We therefore use
the full name when we refer to the CORAS tool.
The first part of this chapter introduces an overall picture of how the SCORE
tool implements the SCORE method. Then we present the tool from a high-level
user point of view with live screen shots that documents the final implemen-
tation. We go further into detail under the design section where we examine
the architectural design through UML2.0 class diagrams and UML2.0 sequence
diagrams. Finally we give a more technical presentation of the implementation
specific details.
The first two sections of this chapter should be readable by anyone, but aims
to address users familiar with the CORAS tool. When we come to the design
section, software modelling knowledge is required and it is meant for readers
with interests in the underlying architectural design, whereas the latter section
is dedicated towards people with programming experience, primarily with J2SE
or equivalent.
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6.1 How the tool implements the SCORE method
Chapter 4 defines a set of predefined rules that describes the behaviour of the
tool. Here we give a detailed account of how the tool supports the SCORE
method driven by an example of the 1-to-1 initiate relationship rule.
However, the 1-to-1 complete rule 4.2.1 is not implemented solely, but is combined






l ≥ (l1 × p)
The main purpose of this rule is to fulfil the use case:
[UC-6]: Calculate likelihood value l of n 1
where l is the output from the SCORE tool. In order to calculate l, the tool is
dependent of that the user has assigned the appropriate likelihood values as
input, namely the use cases:
[UC-5]: Assign likelihood value l1
[UC-5]: Assign likelihood value p1
which is the same use case performed both at the diagram element n1 and the
edge e between n1 and n that holds the likelihood value p1. Again, these are
dependent of the distinct use cases, respectively:
[UV-1] Select single node n1
[UV-1] Select edge e
6.2 Graphical user interface (GUI)
The visual outcome from the SCORE tool work is presented at a user-level
point of view through screen shots of the tool assisted with comments and
explanations.
1For the use case number, refer to section 5.2.1.
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The first at glance and most obvious evidence of the SCORE tool, is the new panel
appearing at the bottom of the diagram window of the editor (the total interface
is presented in figure 5.1 under the tool vision section 5.1). When the tool starts
up, the Properties tab is visible by default. The whole panel can be minimised
to maximise the diagram window, and the user can choose between the tabs:
Properties, Path view, Likelihoods and Consequences. They will all be presented in
detail below.
Property view
Figure 6.1 shows the property view panel with the properties of an unwanted
incident. The Value column on the right hand side consists of editable fields,
except for the Type row that is fixed according to the diagram element type. The
body row takes pure text as input, while the Likelihood and Consequence rows are
drop-down boxes.
Figure 6.1: The property view panel
Assign likelihood
To assign a likelihood value to the selected unwanted incident, the user can use
the drop-down menu in the property panel at the Likelihood row as shown in
figure 6.2 below.
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Figure 6.2: The likelihood values drop-down box
The drop-down menu only contains legal predefined likelihood values, and
when selected the diagram element gets updated on-the-fly. The contained
likelihood values in the drop-down box are defined in the likelihood view (below)
and vary between numerical and linguistic representation according the user’s
choice.
Define likelihoods
Under the tab Likelihoods we find a table containing the likelihood definitions
(figure 6.3). The leftmost column defines the linguistic expressions to which
Figure 6.3: Likelihood definitions
the corresponding other two numerical ones are mapped. The user may self
define whether to express the likelihoods in a numerical or linguistic fashion
by right-clicking the Likelihoods tab (figure 6.4). The Likelihood and Probability
columns define a finite set of disjoint intervals that the user may self redefine.
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Upon modification they become immediately visible in the drop-down box for
likelihoods in the property view according to what diagram element is selected.
When the user selects a relationship, the drop-down box contains the probability
values, and when either unwanted incidents or threat scenarios are selected
it contains frequencies (assumed that numerical view is chosen, otherwise the
linguistic values applies to either or). Note that likelihoods are always stored as
numerical expressions in the diagram elements. However, the linguistic value
shown at the diagram element is only a transformed value from the numerical
ones.
Figure 6.4: Choose between numerical and linguistic likelihood expression
Calculate likelihood values – 1-to-1 initiate relationship
If we assign likelihood values to both the threat scenario and the initiating edge
in figure 6.5, we may choose to automatically calculate the likelihood value of
the unwanted incident. The calculation is simply executing by right-clicking
the unwanted incident and then choose the Calculate likelihood option. Upon
successful calculation the result is automatically stored as the likelihood of the
unwanted incident.
Calculate likelihood values – many-to-1 initiate relationship
The scenario from above may further be extended to include several threat sce-
narios (or other unwanted incidents for that matter). The calculation is executed
the same way, but the results rely on a somewhat more complex calculation
algorithm. Figure 6.6 proves the results of a many-to-1 initiate relationship
calculation.
Remaining tabs
The Consequence tab contains a table similar to the Likelihood tab and their func-
tions are analogues. Defined consequences are updated the same way and are
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Figure 6.5: Aggregating likelihood value on a 1-to-1 initiate relationship
present in the drop-down box of the Consequence row in the Properties panel. The
only difference is that the consequences naturally apply to harm relationships
instead of initiate relationships.
Under the Warnings tab we find a simple listing of warnings produced by the
system to the users. Warnings are created when the user defines illegal likelihood
or consequence intervals (i.e. they contain negative numbers or are not disjoint)
or when there exists inconsistencies in the diagram (i.e. two identical elements
(by origin) contain different likelihood values).
The last tab Path view is a tab meant to display a selected path in the diagram.
This feature is not implemented. However, the idea is that the user may select a
number of elements contained in a path and assign likelihoods on these without
being distracted by the rest of the diagram elements. When finished, the results of
the current path’s likelihood assignments and/or calculations are automatically
inserted back into the rest of the diagram. Other affecting likelihoods will then
be merged with these automatically.
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Figure 6.6: Aggregating likelihood value on a many-to-1 initiate relationship
6.3 Design
This section presents the internal architectural design of the SCORE tool as well
as its dependencies to components in the CORAS tool, through different UML 2.0
modelling diagrams. First we give the context view with respect to the CORAS
tool with an overall UML 2.0 component diagram and a brief presentation of
the relevant features of the CORAS tool components. From section 5.2.1 we are
familiar with the tool’s use cases, and up next in this section we use UML 2.0
sequence diagrams to further specify two of the most central use cases. The
remaining specifications may be found in appendix A. To support the sequence
diagrams, we have a set of UML 2.0 composite structure diagrams that defines
the internal structure of the system in a more general manner and with focus on
the interconnected elements and their collaborations.
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6.3.1 The SCORE tool and the CORAS tool joint component view
The existing implementation of the CORAS tool consists of several components
working together in a complex manner. SCORE impacts only a few, but rather
important components. Most important is of course, the diagram-editor under
which the SCORE mainly operates. Figure 6.7 gives an overall overview of the
collaborating components at the level of the diagram-editor.
Figure 6.7: CORAS overview component diagram
The diagram-editor component
The diagram-editor is a stand-alone component that may be run completely
without the rest of the tool. Its responsibility is to create or edit CORAS diagrams
and store them in a user defined .dgx file or import them into the tool. The
SCORE tool is implemented completely under the diagram-editor package. It
uses the coras-profile to update CORAS diagram elements the same way as the
rest of the diagram-editor.
The coras-profile component
The coras-profile is the package that stores all information about the various
diagram elements. All elements are organised in a hierarchical tree struc-
ture originating from a common coras.profile.diagram.DiagramElement and
further divided into nodes and edges. The diagram-editor represents its dia-
gram elements in a org.jgraph.graph.GraphCell type that is mapped against
the leaf nodes of the coras-profile. The nodes of whom we concern are the
UnwantedIncidentNode, ThreatScenarioNode, InitiateEdge and Harmedge.
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6.3.2 The SCORE tool architectural design
To understand the internal structure of the SCORE tool, we should first have a
look at how the diagram-editor is constructed and where the SCORE tool occurs.
Figure 6.7 outlines the true structure of the CORAS tool as it is implemented
originally with actual java packages and their relations. In order to not getting
distracted by implementation details at the moment, we need to illustrate the ar-
chitectural design of the system. Therefore we choose to use composite structure
diagrams that allow us to design the structural design with respect to the system
elements and their relations without being implementation specific. Implicitly,
this means introducing composite structures that exist within a dedicated class
as to what is defined for a composite structure diagram, even though they do
not exist in the implementation.2
Composite structure - level 1: CORAS main
Below we model the component diagram from figure 6.7 above using a composite
structure diagram. The composite structures are the components from before,
but they have added ports that indicate communication functionality. From now
we also remove all external dependencies such as the enterprise java and jgraph
libraries to focus on the core business of the tool(s).
Composite structure - level 2: diagram-editor
The composite structure diagram in figure 6.8 outlines how the main components
of the diagram-editor including the SCORE tool, are organised.
The composites ProfileImpl, UI and Diagram are the original composites from
the diagram-editor. Their internal structure is mostly kept, but some modifica-
tions are of course required in order to embed the SCORE tool.
Composite structure - level 3: SCORE
If we examine the SCORE tool composite (figure 6.10), namely the SCORE, we see
that the organisation from the original diagram-editor is kept. In addition, we
have added a designated controller, the RiskestimationController to handle
all communication between the ProfileImpl, UI and Method composites.
2However, when we get to the UML 2.0 class diagrams later, all classes are strictly identical
to what is implemented, except the fact that they may be simplified due to readability.
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Composite structure - L1: coras main
diagram-editor : Diagram editor
toProfile fromProfile
profile : CORAS profile
toDiagramEditorfromDiagramEditor
Figure 6.8: Level 1 composite structure diagram




















Figure 6.9: Level 2 composite structure diagram
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Figure 6.10: Level 3 composite structure diagram
In words, the controller receives user input from the diagram-editorand takes
action according to what kind of user input. If the input requests a calculation,
the controller forwards the data to the Method that does the actual calculations
from which in turn is returned to the diagram-editor through the controller.
Before the results are sent back to the diagram-editor, the controller makes sure
to update the affected diagram elements under control by the Diagram.
The next level, level 4, provides the most detailed level of our implementa-
tion. We investigate the UI composite below, but the remaining composites
only contain a few components, hence there is no need to display this graph-
ically. The RiskEstimationController contains only a controller component,
the ProfileImpl contains a LikelihoodValues and a ConsequenceValues com-
ponent to store the respective values and the Method contains a component
LikelihoodCalculator that processes the likelihood calculations and transla-
tions.
6.3.3 The SCORE tool behavioural design
We present the behavioural design of the tool using UML 2.0 sequence diagrams
based on the composite structure shown above and the use cases from section
5.2.1. The use case Assign likelihood value is described to illustrate the most
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important system processes. The presentation order follows the hierarchical
levels from the composite structures.
Interaction diagram: Calculate likelihood value – level 0: user perspective
The risk analysis secretary interacts with the CORAS tool by choosing the feature
Calculate likelihood value l1. As response, he gets to see the diagram element’s
updated properties including the calculated likelihood value.
Figure 6.11: Level 0 interaction diagram - calculate likelihood value
Interaction diagram: Calculate likelihood value – level 1: CORAS main
The diagram-editor reacts to the request by getting hold of the CORAS profile
element, processing the calculation and setting the new likelihood value.
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Figure 6.12: Level 1 sequence diagram - assign likelihood value
Interaction diagram: Calculate likelihood value – level 2: diagram-editor
Internally in the diagram-editor, the SCORE gets noticed of the likelihood calcu-
lation request. The controller gets the hold of the dependent graph cells and
performs sufficient computations before setting the likelihood of the CORAS
element and sees to that appropriate feedback is given to the user.
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Figure 6.13: Level 2 interaction diagram - calculate likelihood value
Interaction diagram: Calculate likelihood value – level 3: risk estimation
The RiskestimationController handles all incoming likelihood change and
processing requests. The first task is to get hold of the dependent source, and
target or edge of the current diagram element as may be. The the controller sends
the information to the likelihood calculator and gets a new likelihood value as
response.
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Figure 6.14: Level 3 interaction diagram - calculate likelihood value
Interaction diagram: Calculate likelihood value – level 4: likelihood calcu-
lator
A likelihood calculator receives likelihood values to be calculated, and this is
where the SCORE method rules are applied. The calculator selects which rule to
apply based on the input and returns the calculated likelihood value.
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Figure 6.15: Level 4 interaction diagram - calculate likelihood value
6.4 Implementation
The SCORE tool is implemented using JavaTM2 Platform Standard Edition 5.0
(j2se5.0). As with the rest of the CORAS tool, the implementation is built and
compiled with Maven 2.0 and developed using Eclipse SDK 3.2. The SCORE tool
implementation relies heavily on the java packages javax.swing and java.awt,
and JGraph5.8 for graphical user interface as for the rest of the diagram-editor.
To present the implementation, we use a UML 2.0 class diagram in which we
examine some of the most central classes. CORAS is an open source project, thus
the full source code of the SCORE tool can be obtained through anonymous ac-
cess to the CORAS SourceForge.net Subversion repository [32] , branched under
coras/branches/stig/src/modules/diagram-editor. However this downloads
the full diagram-editor source code and what is related to the SCORE work
may be hard to isolate.
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The overall class diagram
Figure 6.16 presents the overall class diagram for the SCORE tool. From the
design presentation we recognise first of all the RiskEstimationController as
the main controller class. Its main communication lines goes to the
DiagramPropertyView, which is the interface towards the GUI of the
diagram-editor, and the LikelihoodCalculator that obviously performs the
calculations. Moreover the figure explains how the different tabs from the prop-







































Figure 6.16: the SCORE tool overview class diagram
Changes in coras-profile
The diagram elements unwanted incident, threat scenario, initiate relationship and
harm relationship need all to be assigned a likelihood value. The first two men-
tioned are sub classes of the CorasGraphCell and we easily add the private
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attribute likelihood as a String representing the assigned likelihood. The two
relationships may be assigned a likelihood the same way.
Asserted for all of the above is the format the likelihoods are stored in, namely
a String representation of a numerical set. Even though the application user
assigns linguistic likelihoods, these are translated into the numerical definitions
in order to possibly perform calculations thereupon. When the diagram elements
need to show the likelihood in a qualitative expression again, the numerical
interval is mapped back to its corresponding linguistic value using the mean of
the upper and lower bounds according to the SCORE method.
Class attributes and operations
The class diagram overview from figure 6.16 only explains the relations between
the classes contained in the system. For more details, please refer to appendix




In chapter 3 we define a set of success criteria for SCORE. They provide the
basis for the evaluation of the SCORE project in total. We also make use of the
developed requirements specifications document B for the evaluation, but since
this is developed with the purpose of specifying a fully functional system, they
are not evaluated strictly.
In order to test to what extent the SCORE project fulfils its success criteria, we
apply SCORE to the following evaluation strategies. First we present a case
study that serves the purpose of the experimental simulation. The case is an
industrial security risk analysis that applied the SCORE tool-supported method
and was conducted with particular emphasis to this evaluation. Next we put
SCORE into a more fixed laboratory setting where we try to provoke unexpected
behaviour, before we apply a non-empirical evidence strategy that provides a
walk-through of the tool-supported method.
7.1 Case study
This case study conducts a security risk analysis using the CORAS method
assisted by the SCORE tool-supported method. The focus is in particular on
the risk estimation process. The complete results of the risk analysis is a report
that can be investigated in appendix C. Here we provide a brief summary and
reproduce the most important findings from the risk analysis.
One presumption has been made before conducting the security risk analysis
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7.1.1 Security risk analysis of the IT-system at Stubrud sjakk shop
The risk analysis is conducted in accordance with the CORAS method for Model-
based Risk Analysis developed in the CORAS and SECURIS projects. The
CORAS risk management process consists of the following five sub-processes:
Context identification – identify the context of the analysis. Describe the ap-
plication(s) and/or organisation; identify usage scenarios, the assets of the
target of analysis, and the risk evaluation criteria.
Risk identification – identify the potential threats to assets and the vulnerabili-
ties of these assets. Identify unwanted incidents.
Risk estimation – estimate the consequence and frequency value of each un-
wanted incident identified in sub-process 2.
Risk evaluation – identify the level of risk associated with the unwanted inci-
dents already identified and assessed in the previous sub-processes.
Risk treatment – address the treatment of the identified risks, and how to
prevent the unacceptable risks.
Each of the phases will be examined more or less below. We emphasise the
risk estimation phase, but the remaining will only be summarised sufficiently
enough for the reader to understand the basics and the risk estimation phase.
Context identification
The risk analysis is performed at the e-commerce web-shop Stubrub sjakk shop
(sjakk = chess), from now simply referred to as the sjakk shop. The company
is a sole proprietorship and is marketed mainly through its website corporate
www.sjakk-shop.no where it makes most of its sales turnover. The manager (and
sole proprietor) runs his business mostly on his own from his home office. This
is also where all physical assets like product stock and of course office facilities
are located. Although the web hosting of the online website and the accounting
system is outsourced to a third party, the office holds business critical tools
such as a local computer system. Figure 7.1 shows the relevant elements that
constitutes the environment around the target of evaluation (TOE).
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Figure 7.1: Target of evaluation and environment
Target of evaluation concerns the local computer system that the manager uses
to carry out the everyday duties of the sjakk-shop. We have identified two assets
of the Sjakk shop that the risk analysis is conducted with respect to:




The confidentiality of the company’s e-
mail and customer registry located at the
local computer system
375 000,-
E-mail availability The availability of the sjakk-shop e-mail 25 000,-
Table 7.1: Asset table
The context identification phase involves defining likelihood and consequence
values and the risk evaluation criteria. Note the probability values (table 7.3)
that play an important part in the field trial due to the significance for the SCORE
project (their influence will be explained and discussed later). The consequence
values are given in table 7.4 and 7.5 respective for each of the assets.
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Frequency values
(Normalised values pr. year in parenthesis)
Almost never Yearly (< 1)
Very seldom Monthly (1 − 12)
Seldom Weekly (13 − 122)
Often Every 1-3 days (123 − 365)
Very often Daily (> 365)
Table 7.2: Frequency values
Probability values
Distribution domain in range [0 − 1]
Very low < 0 − 0.1]
Low < 0.1 − 0.3]
Medium < 0.3 − 0.6]
High < 0.6 − 0.8]
Very high < 0.8 − 1]
Table 7.3: Probability values
Consequence values
Loss of income (1000 NOK)
(E-mail/customer register confidentiality)
Insignificant 0 − 10
Moderate 11 − 25
Large 26 − 50
Critical 51 − 150
Catastrophic > 151
Table 7.4: Consequence values:
E-mail/customer register confidentiality




Insignificant 0 to 3 hours
Moderate 4 hours to 1 day
Large 2 to 5 days
Critical 6 to 14 days
Catastrophic 15 days +
Table 7.5: Consequence values:
E-mail availability
In the risk evaluation phase the risk evaluation criteria are used in practise
(figure 7.6 and 7.7), but we leave them out here to save space. The sjakk-shop is
a company with high focus on security and does not accept a high level of risk,
especially with respect to the e-mail/customer register confidentiality asset. Figure
7.6 proves this point by not accepting more than moderate risks at medium
frequency. Likewise with the asset e-mail availability (figure 7.7), but since this
one has lower priority, we accept a slightly higher risk level.
Risk identification
The risk identification phase has for its object to reveal and identify possible
risks to the predefined assets. This is done by first to define what unwanted
incidents could occur in our context. Next we deduce their causes by identifying
existing and/or possible threats and vulnerabilities. The results of this phase, are
the diagrams under the risk evaluation phase below (figure 7.2 and 7.3), except
without the likelihood and consequence values.
Risk evaluation
The identified risks from the previous phase are now evaluated with respect
to the probability for the risks to occur and the possible impact they would
have to the respective asset. In practise, we assign the unwanted incident with
likelihood and consequence values, and the risks can now be evaluated with
respect to the risk evaluation criteria we defined in the context identification
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7.1.1. The diagram below shows the result of this phase, and they are the same
threat diagrams as the previous phase defined, but with the mentioned values
assigned.
7.1. CASE STUDY 79
Figure 7.2: Customer registry confidentiality
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Figure 7.3: E-mail availability
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In order to be able to rate the risk, we name them as follows:
Figure 7.4: Customer registry confidentiality
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Figure 7.5: E-mail availability
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When the risks are inserted into the risk evaluation criteria matrices, it is easy to
see which risks are subject to treatment evaluation, namely the risks R2, R3 and






























Figure 7.7: Risk evaluation criteria matrix: Inaccessible time
Treatment
Refer to appendix C for the treatment results.
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7.1.2 Case study experiences
During the risk analysis the risk analysis participants made a number of experi-
ences summarised below.
Feedback from field expert
The field expert (Stubrud) had the following responsibilities during the risk
analysis (amongst others – we emphasise tasks related to the risk estimation
phase):
• provide the context identification including definition of frequency, likeli-
hood and consequence scales
• identify the threat picture by creating threat diagrams
• assign likelihood values to the identified threat scenarios (note: not all of
them, but the ones identified as leaf nodes of a fault tree)
• assign probability values to all of the initiate relationships
• assign consequence values to the harm relationships
After the risk analysis was finalised, the field expert (Stubrud) was asked to
review the results related to the risk estimation and compare them to his expec-
tations. He was asked the following questions:
With respect to each of the respective risks (R1,R2, R3 and R4); how do the
general results from the risk estimation phase correspond to your expecta-
tions? Do their locations in the risk matrices seem reasonable, or would you
expect a different result?
With respect to each of the identified unwanted incidents; do the assigned
likelihood values seem reasonable based on the input you provided for the
threat scenarios, or do any of them seem to have a too high or too low
likelihood?
His response can be summarised in a generic manner:
The general results of the risk estimation seem reasonable. R1 would be
OK to accept, hence it is appropriately located at the accepted area in the
risk evaluation criteria matrix (figure 7.6). R2 in the same matrix needs
evaluation, but is located only one step from the accepted area, which seems
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within reason. The second risk evaluation matrix (figure 7.7) however, may
be questioned. Firstly the risk R3 located one step from the accepted area
and subject to evaluation is approved and OK. The last risk, R4, may be
evaluated somewhat too high in frequency. It is more likely to believe that
it should be located only one step from the accepted area than two steps that
is the current situation.
Feedback from risk analysis leader
The risk analysis leader (Torsbakken) had the following responsibilities dur-
ing the risk analysis (amongst others – we emphasise tasks related to the risk
estimation phase):
• document the context identification into the CORAS tool including defini-
tion of frequency, likelihood and consequence scales
• document and support the threat picture identification through creating
threat diagrams using the CORAS tool
• document the likelihood values assigned to the threat scenarios
• document the probability values assigned to the initiate relationships and
making sure all of them were covered
• document the consequence values assigned to the harm relationships
Due to the limited available resources for the risk analysis, the risk analysis leader
also held the title of the risk analysis secretary thus additionally performing her
responsibilities (i.e. documenting the risk analysis results).
Response from the security analysis leader with respect to the generated results
of the risk estimation phase:
The results from the risk estimation phase seem fairly reasonable. The sjakk-
shop emphasises information security to a large extent and does not allow for
a high level of risk acceptance. This comes obvious from the risk evaluation
criteria matrices, but still the company sees its own improvement potential
through the risks that are evaluated for treatment.
Response regarding the practical conduction of the risk estimation phase:
Since there existed practically no statistics or historical data regarding the
identified unwanted incidents, the likelihood values needed to be assigned to
the very first initiating threat scenarios all along. However, this was also the
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purpose with respect to evaluation of SCORE. Compared to other analyses, it
was a relief not having to worry about the composite unwanted incidents, but
instead be able to target the initiating threat scenarios directly. Likelihood
estimations seemed more accurate and reliable for the threat scenarios than
they would have been for unwanted incidents.
7.2 Evaluation of the SCORE method
With the case study accounted for above kept fresh in mind we perform an
evaluation of the SCORE method. We investigate the method rules successively
and their underlying theories and exemplify this using the case study diagrams
to illustrate the rules’ application and presence.
In order to understand the results of the SCORE method applied to the Sjakk-
shop risk analysis, we need to further investigate the threat diagrams evolved
from the risk evaluation. In the risk analysis itself (and also in its summary
in section 7.1) we only display the linguistic risk estimation values, but in the
following we illustrate what happens behind the scenes where the calculations
from the SCORE method rules take place.
Figure 7.8 and 7.9 provides the complete overview of the diagrams with all
likelihoods assigned, but here transformed into numerical values for the purpose
of the evaluation. Subsequently we focus on the SCORE method rules one by
one and explaining them with figure extracts from the two figures.
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Figure 7.8: E-mail/customer register confidentiality: Risk estimation numerical
88 CHAPTER 7. EVALUATION
Figure 7.9: E-mail availability: Risk estimation numerical
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Defining a set
Sets are defined in the diagram elements as numerical intervals mapped to
a linguistic value. Figure 7.10 selects one example that explains how this is
represented in the diagram.
Figure 7.10: Defining a set
The threat scenario from figure 7.10 is assigned a frequency value while the
initiate relationship has a probability value. Exactly how the likelihood values
are assigned, we can see in the table in figure 7.11 which is a screen shot of the
likelihood panel in the SCORE tool.
Figure 7.11: Table of likelihood definitions
1-to-1 initiate relationship
The same figure from above (7.10) also illustrates the calculation that has taken
place over the initiate relationship from the threat scenario. We see that a fre-
quency of 1-12 times a year yields a slightly lower frequency when its probability
to initiate the next threat scenario is as high as 0.7-0.8, namely 0.7-9.6. In order to
not loose information through a calculation, we need to keep the exact calculated
value in every instance of the calculation through the diagram.
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Many-to-1 initiate relationship
Figure 7.12 exemplifies a situation where two threat scenarios both may initiate
a third threat scenario. We see that even though one of the threat scenarios
has originally a relatively high frequency, it provides little contribution to the
aggregated frequency due to its low probability.
Figure 7.12: Many-to-1 initiate relationship
Set multiplication and addition
To further look into the calculations from the previous example in figure 7.12, the
multiplication of the frequency interval 12−122 and its corresponding probability
0 − 0.1 would yield the result 0 − 12.2. The other one, 1 − 12 to 0.7 − 0.8 yields
correspondingly the result 0.7 − 21.8. Together they are added with the result
0.7 − 21.8.
Selecting the correct interval
We continue to use the same example from figure 7.12 and we see that the
calculated likelihood do not match or fall withing any of the predefined intervals.
The original threat diagram (figure 7.2) however, contains linguistic values, hence
we need to decide for one of the intervals that the calculated one shares a part
of. The rule 4.3.4 yields to select the interval in which the mean of the calculated
interval falls within. In this case, that would be 11.25 that belongs to Very seldom
as also in the diagram 7.9.
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Inconsistencies
Figure 7.13 illustrates a scenario where a threat scenario has been assigned a
likelihood value manually by the field expert and then gets initiated by another
threat scenario (what we call automatic likelihood assignment). For such inci-
dents, the rule 4.3.5 yields that the combined likelihood should be a calculated
result of the intersection of the two contributions instead of the union as in
normal cases.
Figure 7.13: Inconsistencies
The sjakk-shop field trial was however not able to test this scenario because the
feature was not implemented in the CORAS tool.
Summary
We have illustrated examples of how both numerical frequency and probability
sets may be defined. These have further been aggregated through the diagrams
by applying rules for both 1-to-1 and many-to-1 initiate relationships that in
turn apply set addition and multiplication. Finally mappings from calculated
numerical intervals to their correct linguistic expressions were described. The
inconsistency rules could however not be illustrated.
The SCORE tool rules provides definitions on how to define the probability
sets and linguistic values, but not likelihood values expressed as frequencies.
Despite this limitation, we have made the assumption that frequencies can be
treated similarly, hence we perform calculations on a mix of probability and
frequency representations.
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7.3 The SCORE tool testing
In order to test the SCORE tool to its extreme, we perform a software test that
serves the purpose of the laboratory experiment proposed in chapter 3 under the
evaluation strategies section. The purpose of the testing is to provoke unexpected
behaviour.
We create a few specially designed test scenarios that we model using CORAS
threat diagrams supported by SCORE:
1. 1-to-1 complete relationships (numerical)
2. Many-to-1 complete relationships (numerical)
3. 1-to-1 complete relationships (linguistic)
4. Many-to-1 complete relationships (linguistic)




The test scenarios are evaluated according to whether or not they exist as a
feature in the SCORE tool and if they do; are they fully functional? The complete
results and all test scenario listings can be found in appendix D, but below we
provide a schematic view of the overall results. Each of the test scenarios is
evaluated with respect to whether they meet their respective requirements or
not. They are graded asX – met, + – partly met, and - – not met.
Scenario Exists Functional
1 X X not robust
2 + not constrained to probabilis-
tic domain
X not robust
3 X X not robust
4 X X not robust
5 X X
6 - not implemented -
7 - not implemented -
8 + partly implemented -
Table 7.6: The SCORE tool test results
The evaluation of the test scenarios tells us that most of the software requirements
are met. Those that fail, 2, 6, 7 and 8, are in general features to improve usability
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of the SCORE tool. On the other hand, the acknowledged ones are those vital to
prove the success criteria as we will see in the next chapter. There are also issues
related to robustness of the SCORE tool in general. Robustness is important
when the tool moves on to its next phase of being a commercial implementation,




Fulfilment of success criteria
In this chapter we will evaluate the SCORE method and tool with respect to
its defined success criteria and identified requirements. The detailed success
criteria are defined in chapter 3 and structured in three parts that we here suc-
cessively will examine one by one. The evaluation is based on the findings from
the evaluation chapter (chapter 7). Each and one of them are validated or falsi-
fied during a systematic walkthrough where we provide a short reasoning and
point out where they are presented and evaluated. We start with the SCORE
method; follow up with the SCORE tool before we lastly examine the SCORE
tool-supported method in total with respect to CORAS. Once the detailed success
criteria are fulfilled, we use these to argue whether the overall success criteria P1
- P5 are fulfilled. Finally this yields enough information in order for us to give a
statements on the overall hypothesis H1.
During all of the validations, we use the following notations to express degree
of fulfilment: X – fulfilled, + – partly fulfilled and - – not fulfilled (or falsified).
In cases where the two latter are used, we should provide an explanatory com-
ment and take special consideration to these when further evaluating the overall
success criteria.
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8.1 Detailed success criteria
8.1.1 The SCORE method
The SCORE method shall: provide rules that defines the risk estimation calcu-
lations in CORAS diagrams
1. define rules for likelihood calculations on 1-to-1 initiate relationships
X Fulfilled
- calculation of numerical values shall be supported
→ Rule 4.2.1 and 4.2.3 supports calculation of numerical values
- calculation of qualitative values shall be supported
→ Qualitative expressions may be defined as sets according to the rule
4.3.1 and set calculations are defined in rule 4.3.2 and 4.3.3
The 1-to-1 initiate relationship rule is evaluated in 7.2 and found to be
fulfilled through logical reasoning. A frequency may only be reduced when
a probability no larger than 1 is assigned. The reasoning is acknowledged
by both the evaluation referenced, but also the field trial feedback in 7.1.2.
2. define rules for likelihood calculations on many-to-1 initiate relationships
X Fulfilled
- calculation of numerical values shall be supported
→ Rule 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 supports calculation of numerical values
- calculation of qualitative values shall be supported
→ Qualitative expressions may be defined as sets according to the rule
4.3.1 and set calculations are defined in rule 4.3.2 and 4.3.3
The many-to-1 initiate relationship rule is evaluated in 7.2 and found to be
fulfilled through logical reasoning. When two or more elements initiate
another element with respective given probabilities, the aggregated like-
lihood is a result of the sum of all initiating elements’ contributions. The
reasoning is acknowledged by both the evaluation referenced, but also the
field trial feedback in 7.1.2.
3. define how to translate qualitative values into numerical sets applicable
for likelihood calculations
X Fulfilled
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→ Qualitative expressions may be defined as sets according to the rule 4.3.1
Set definitions are evaluated in 7.2 and together with the translation be-
tween sets and qualitative expressions evaluated in 7.2, qualitative expres-
sions are proved to possibly be defined as sets.
4. define rules for dealing with inconsistencies
+ Partly fulfilled
- Comment: rule exists, but is not sufficiently tested
→ Rule 4.3.5 and 4.3.5 defines behaviour when inconsistencies occur.
8.1.2 The SCORE tool
The SCORE tool shall: provide a tool-support for the SCORE method
1. provide the ability to assign likelihood values to threat scenarios
X Fulfilled
- both numerical and qualitative values shall be available to be assigned
→ the existence of the feature is proved in 6.2 and further evaluated in
7.3
- the likelihood values shall be stored in the unique node
→ the implementation, in 6.4 proves that threat scenarios are extended
with an attribute to hold the assigned likelihood, and this is implicitly
evaluated through the whole of the field trial (7.1)
2. provide the ability to assign likelihood values to unwanted incidents
X Fulfilled
- both numerical and qualitative values shall be available to be assigned
→ the existence of the feature is proved in 6.2 and further evaluated in
7.3
- the likelihood values shall be stored in the unique node
→ the implementation, in 6.4 proves that unwanted incidents are ex-
tended with an attribute to hold the assigned likelihood, and this is
implicitly evaluated through the whole of the field trial (7.1)
3. provide the ability to assign likelihood values to initiate relationships
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+ Partly fulfilled
- Comment: ability exists, but no restrictions on input values provided
- the likelihood values shall be probability values in the range [0-1]
→ the implementation allows for the probabilities to be assigned a prob-
ability value, but yields no constraints on the legal range of the prob-
abilities
- the likelihood values shall be stored in the unique relationship
→ the implementation, in 6.4 proves that initiate relationships are ex-
tended with an attribute to hold the assigned likelihood, and this is
implicitly evaluated through the whole of the field trial (7.1)
4. provide the ability to assign consequence values to harm relationships
X Fulfilled
→ the existence of the feature is proved in 6.2 and further evaluated in 7.3
5. automatically calculate possible likelihood values according to the SCORE
method
X Partly fulfilled
- Comment: feature exists, but is not sufficiently tested with respect to
robustness
→ the existence of the feature is proved in 6.2 and 6.2 and further evaluated
in 7.3
- the tool shall perform a test to validate that sufficient input data is available
upon execution
→ the test is not fully implemented and robustness of system is only
partly tested in 7.3
- the tool shall keep the exact calculated values for further calculations in cases
of round-offs and translation between numerical and qualitative values
→ the existence of the feature is proved in 6.4 and further evaluated in
7.3
6. provide an overview of the properties of the diagram elements
X Fulfilled
→ the existence of the feature is proved in 6.2 and further evaluated in 7.3
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8.1.3 The SCORE tool-supported method in CORAS
The SCORE tool-supported method shall: be integrated with CORAS
1. apply to CORAS diagrams
X Fulfilled
- the tool-supported method shall apply to the risk estimation phase
and threat diagrams in special
→ this criteria is proved in the field trial where only CORAS threat
diagrams are used to assign likelihoods (7.1)
2. be integrated with the CORAS tool
X Fulfilled
→ the screen-shot documentation in 5.1 is a living proof that the SCORE tool
is integrated withing the CORAS tool and so also with the implementation
documentation (6.4)
8.1.4 Summary
The general impression from the validation above is that most of the success
criteria are fulfilled. The SCORE method and the tool-supported method’s inte-
gration in CORAS score the best results. The SCORE tool is where most problems
occur, but still none of the criteria are falsified. However, this does not mean that
the tool is fully functional – there is obviously a lot of work to be done, especially
on robustness issues to make the tool unassailable.
8.2 Overall success criteria
Based on the evaluation of the detailed success criteria above, we argue the
fulfilment of the overall success criteria which are dependent on the results from
above.
A carefully designed tool-supported method:
Overall success criterion 1
P1: will provide the ability to merely assign likelihood values to threat scenarios and
automate likelihood aggregation to unwanted incidents
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X Fulfilled
The field trial (7.1) only assigned manual likelihood values to threat scenarios
and used the tool-supported method to calculate the likelihoods to the unwanted
incidents. Based on this and the validations from above, we also validate P1 as
fulfilled.
Overall success criterion 2
P2: will be able to calculate likelihood values for diagram elements initiated through
intricate relations
X Fulfilled
To account for intricate relations first, we assume this to apply to many-to-1 initiate
relationships and even reiterated occurrences of such. Both the SCORE method
and the SCORE tool have been validated for the possible relations and in that
respect we claim P2 to be validated as fulfilled accordingly.
Overall success criterion 3
P3: will handle an arbitrary large number of input
+ Partly Fulfilled
The SCORE method applies no restrictions on the number of input and the rules
are confirmed to be valid through no matter how much input we provide. The
SCORE tool however, has been proved to suffer under robustness issues, hence
cannot guarantee for an arbitrary large number of input. Due to this, P3 is only
partly fulfilled.
When concerning effectiveness in terms of time-saving, the tool-supported method
should apply means to what type of input to process.
Overall success criterion 4
P4: will provide the ability to merely deal with qualitative data, but still yield
calculations thereupon
X Fulfilled
Mappings between qualitative data and numerical intervals have been defined
to account for this and the tool is designed with the same purpose. Both set
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mappings and set calculations have been validated above, hence we may also
validate P4 as fulfilled.
Overall success criterion 5
P5: will provide the ability to merely assign likelihood values to threat scenarios and
automate likelihood aggregation to unwanted incidents
X Fulfilled
This prediction yields the same criteria as P1 except for the time-saving perspec-
tive. In that respect we need to look more into usability of the SCORE tool.
It is obvious that a tool that may break down or yield unexpected behaviour
may cause major time loss. Although the SCORE tool suffers under robustness
issues, there is little doubt that a carefully designed and hence robust tool would
validate P5 as fulfilled with the reasoning from P1 kept in mind and time-saving
accounted for. Therefore P5 is also fulfilled.
8.3 Overall hypothesis
H1: a carefully designed tool-supported method will increase the efficiency of risk
estimation using CORAS diagrams
From the evaluation of both the overall and detailed success criteria, we have seen
that most of the criteria are fulfilled and just a few partly fulfilled. None has been
falsified, and the most severe problems have been related to the implementation
of the SCORE tool and the robustness of this. However, the SCORE tool is
meant to be a prototype with the purpose to illustrate the functionality of a
computerised tool that we may use to evaluate the overall hypothesis H1. We
believe that both the SCORE tool and the SCORE method have fulfilled their
mission, and if we assume that the overall success criteria together with the
detailed success criteria covers sufficient aspects of the overall hypothesis to be




In the precedent chapter we have seen the success criteria from chapter 3.6 been
validated with respect to our research and evaluation strategies. In this chapter
we account for assumptions and considerations and possible threats to validity
of our results, with the purpose to reveal eventual unexplained causes that could
possibly affect our findings enough to question the liability of the SCORE project.
We do this by first looking into assumptions and considerations made along the
way. Then we investigate the validation of the success criteria and what we see
as threats for hence. At last we perform a final validation of the success criteria
again based on all of the above.
9.1 Assumptions and considerations
During the SCORE project work there have been several assumptions and con-
siderations we have had to make. Some of them well argued and discussed, but
also those that have come naturally or have been necessary to decide for ad-hoc.
First we will look into our selection of background material and see if this is
sufficient enough for our problem description. Next we review the proposed
and later executed research methods. In the following comes an examination of
aspects concerning the SCORE method before the SCORE tool subsequently. At
last we discuss aspects related to the evaluation of SCORE.
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9.1.1 Selection of background material
The background material provided concerns in general security risk analysis and
different technologies and methods used to perform such. Most importantly is
the presentation of CORAS diagrams. This is obviously inevitable due to the
focus of the SCORE project, but the other established techniques are results of a
deliberate selection.
The selection is inspired by the needs for the CORAS risk estimation phase,
amongst others described in [3], but also to a large extent on the NS 5814 guide
to risk analysis [6]. The latter also suggests an analysis technique called FMECA
(failure modes, effects and criticality analysis) that could have been relevant for
SCORE. FMECA aims to identify potential system failures, but is however not
directly applicable to SCORE. It may rather be used as a preliminary analysis
technique whose results may constitute a foundation for our selected techniques
to build on.
One objective of SCORE is to deal with qualitative data received as input from
the risk estimation phase. The SCORE method applies basically mathematical
theories to handle such input. However there are research areas that have
examined those problems on a large scale, often called fuzzy theories. Research
of Papadaki [19] [20], amongst others [21], proposes theories containing rather
complex algorithms for computation of likelihood values. Most of the theories
are based on input from multiple experts, and we have used the theories as
inspiration in our work with the SCORE method. However, we have come to
the conclusion that we need to determine if the basic ideas of SCORE are worth
implementing in the first place. Fuzzy theories may hence be proposed as a
future extension of SCORE.
9.1.2 Chosen research techniques
In chapter 3 we propose a few research strategies that the SCORE project should
follow both with respect to requirements retrieval and evaluation of the de-
veloped tool-supported method. We argue that our research strategies should
fulfil McGrath’s three characteristics [28], but there would always be room for
performing more and better strategies to document either or. What limit the
possible number of such techniques is often time and available resources, so also
with the SCORE project. Below, in section 9.2.2 we look into one technique that
could preferably have been conducted in the SCORE project, namely a field trial
similar to the initial case study.
9.1. ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS 105
9.1.3 Designated SCORE method rules
The SCORE method rules defined in chapter 4 evolved from the needs of SCORE
we identified in the preceding chapter 3. Again, related to the discussion about
the research techniques in the previous section, we could have applied qualitative
in-depth interviews with current CORAS experts and users at SINTEF to be
absolutely certain that the correct needs have been captured. Such research
would also probably further expanded the user requirements for SCORE.
At the time of completion of the case study, we believed (and still do) that
more than enough background material was recovered and sufficient experience
gained in order to state the requirements for SCORE.
9.1.4 Design of the SCORE tool
Upon modelling the architectural design of the SCORE tool, we had to make a
decision on to what extent the SCORE tool should be a stand-alone supportive
tool to the CORAS tool or an integrated part of this. The problem is addressed
also in chapter 3, and we conclude that in order to be applied to a CORAS
security risk analyses in practise, it is a necessity for the SCORE tool to be an
integrated part of the CORAS tool.
How to visually represent SCORE and how to provide the interface for data
collection (i.e. assignment of likelihood values) plus display the calculation
results have also been subject to discussion. The focus of the project is however
not usability or graphical design, hence there exist little research on this. What
became obvious during the development was first of all that the likelihoods
should be visible on the CORAS diagram elements. The bottom panel containing
properties and likelihood definitions etc. is not that obvious, but is inspired by
other modelling tools such as the eclipse development platform [33]. A panel
like that is easily extendable to contain other features not related to SCORE such
as attributes and properties, and offers an easy way to both inspect and alter the
information provided.
9.1.5 Application of SCORE in the evaluation
During the sjakk-shop field trial we made an important assumption related to
legal definitions of likelihood values. Likelihood is defined in the CORAS lan-
guage [25] as a general description of frequency or probability. The SCORE method
only defines probabilistic sets as legal likelihood representations, but since they
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are hard to relate to as frequencies of incidents, we carried through with calcula-
tions also applied to frequency representations. The initiate relationships were
probability representations though, thus the factual calculations were executed
using a mix of both representation types. A dedicated evaluation of probability
calculations exclusively may be investigated in the experimental simulation in
chapter 7.3 instead.
Even though the tool-supported method provides both logic’s and tool-support
for both frequency and probability representations, it does not imply that this
is a part of the CORAS language and thus defined in the CORAS semantics. To
determine this would be an own project itself and is up to the respective experts
of CORAS and beyond the scope of SCORE. However, this should be looked
upon as a proposal to further research in the development of CORAS.
9.2 Threats to the validity of results
In all research there may exist uncertain variables affecting the results of the
research. Here we will try to identify what could possibly threaten the validity
and liability of our findings by criticising our executed research methods.
9.2.1 Quality assurance of SCORE requirements
Chapter 3 defines the success criteria for the SCORE project and chapter 5 defines
the requirements to the SCORE tool. They are all based on research from a case
study (section 3.2) and findings from the problem analysis in chapter 3 that both
aim to identify the needs for the SCORE tool-supported method. However,
they are never subject to re-examination or quality assurance before they are
implemented. In order to play by the book, requirements should be evaluated
before implementation to make sure that we in fact have captured and fulfilled
the actual needs. We may have convinced ourselves that we have done so, but
such requirements should be formally approved by the client commissioning the
project.
9.2.2 Liability of field trial
The risk analysis performed as the field trial for realistic evaluation of the SCORE
tool-supported method was performed in a subjective manner. The risk analysis
leader was this master thesis’s candidate and the field expert (and target owner)
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a family member of his. Such close relations to the results of the field trial could
of course affect their objectiveness since they would both care for the final results
of the master thesis.
Preferably, the risk analysis should be performed by a professional risk analysis
team with no intervention or subjective interest in the development of the SCORE
tool-supported method. A field trial or case study similar to the initial case
study performed to identify the needs for SCORE (refer to 3.2) would have
been perfect in that respect. The field trial would involve SINTEF and require
resources from their current research project that involves CORAS. Such study
would unquestionably provide the best realism since it then would be tested and
examined in its natural and ever intended application environment.
Although CORAS is constantly developing and all field trials are run with the
purpose to evaluate and improve the various aspects of CORAS, we cannot
forget the client and customer perspective regarding such security risk analyses.
As cooperative partners, the commissioning clients have their own interests in
the security risk analysis. They put a lot of effort and resources into conducting
a security risk analysis within their organisation and hence demand quality
and professionalism from the risk analysis team and their methods. In that
respect; SCORE should been proved as an advantageous tool-supported method
worthwhile implementing in the first place before introduced as a dedicated part
of CORAS. This is what we aim to achieve with the sjakk-shop field trial and we
believe it has fulfilled its purpose.
9.2.3 Research strategies – empirical investigations
Motivated by the statement from the previous section, we should preferably have
tested the SCORE tool-supported method on a liable industrial risk analysis.
With such a risk analysis available, we could have produced empirical data for
validation and compared these to the initial case study. Empirical data from in-
depth interviews or field observations provides particular realism to a research
study [28].
9.2.4 Liability of experimental simulation
The test scenarios we have created for the SCORE tool were obviously too few
and less comprehensive. Also, the chosen test sets should have been an arbitrary
large number of random sets.
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9.3 Validation
Finally in this chapter we will answer the question:
Are the impact of the identified threats to the validity of results and
our assumptions and considerations significant enough to affect the total
liability of the success criteria validation?
Based on the discussions above, we conclude that the liability to the evaluation of
SCORE has the most severe reason to be questioned, but still the validation of our
superior hypothesis remains liable. However, further testing of the SCORE tool
would be a natural part of any software engineering project and hence subject
to further development. The SCORE method must also continue evolving over
time from experiences made from applied field trials.
Chapter 10
Conclusion
This thesis has presented and documented the results from the research of the
SCORE project. The SCORE project has successfully investigated the hypothe-
sis:
H1: a carefully designed tool-supported method will increase the efficiency of risk
estimation using CORAS diagrams
Hypothesis H1 aims to handle problems related to documenting and processing
risk estimations using CORAS diagrams. The needs for such method evolve
from the risk estimation phase of a CORAS security risk analysis where the
participating parties often experience difficulties concerning risk estimations.
The main objective of the project has been to develop a tool-supported method
to overcome this troublesome activity. Success of the SCORE project has been
evaluated with respect to H1 through validation of defined success criteria.
The SCORE tool-supported method has in total been evaluated as a success with respect
to its overall hypothesis H1.
The SCORE project has contributed with a well-documented tool-supported
method for risk estimation using CORAS diagrams; the SCORE method and
tool. Based on evaluation of our proposed tool-supported method, among them
a CORAS security risk analysis, we believe that the SCORE method and tool
should be implemented with the next official release of the CORAS tool and
such be applied to future CORAS security risk analyses.
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10.1 Findings
The following lists the main findings of the SCORE project:
The SCORE project has:
• revealed a need for a structured methodical approach to the activity of
risk estimation in a CORAS security risk analysis based on: a case study
of such, investigation CORAS diagrams, and analysis of established risk
modelling techniques
• identified a method providing a set of rules with the purpose to structure
and standardise the documenting and processing of risk estimation data;
the SCORE method
• evolved a computerised tool prototype providing support for the SCORE
method and an interface to document and automate the processing of risk
estimation data; the SCORE tool
• been evaluated as a success with respect to its overall hypothesis H1
10.2 Future work
From our experiences through working with the SCORE project we have experi-
enced what could be further work related to risk estimation in CORAS diagrams.
10.2.1 The SCORE method
The SCORE method can be developed further in several directions. Primarily,
there are techniques related to fuzzy theories that may be applied.
During a risk analysis there may be multiple system experts present with dif-
ferent opinions when it comes to defining likelihood and consequence values.
Instead of forcing these to agree on a compromise value, we may calculate a
combined value based on each individual statement. This may especially come
to hand when the risk analysis workshops are organised with teamwork from
multiple teams. We recommend to apply the theories from Papadaki: fuzzy
multiple criteria decision making method [19] and [20].
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10.2.2 The SCORE tool
The SCORE tool needs extensive work with respect to usability in order to be
applicable for the next official release of the CORAS tool. The implementation
needs to be improved such that it reaches a commercial level and not the state of
a prototype as for now. Furthermore should the requirements specifications be
investigated and be asserted to be implemented fully.
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The SCORE tool architectural
design
In this appendix we present the architectural design of the SCORE tool. For
textual descriptions; refer to chapter 6. Note that the interaction diagrams are
not fully complete, but is subject to black-boxing of the most implementation
specific details.
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The SCORE tool architectural design
Composite structure - L1: coras main
diagram-editor : Diagram editor
toProfile fromProfile
profile : CORAS profile
toDiagramEditorfromDiagramEditor
Figure A.1: Level 1 composite structure diagram
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Figure A.2: Level 2 composite structure diagram
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Figure A.3: Level 3 composite structure diagram
composite structure - L4: UI
propertyPanel : DiagramPropertyView



























Figure A.4: Level 4 composite structure diagram
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The SCORE tool behavioural design
Here we provide interaction diagrams for the use cases: calculate likelihood value
and assign likelihood value.
Calculate likelihood value
This use case is initiated by the user when likelihood values have been assign
to the diagram element’s initiating elements and relations. We only describe a
happy-day scenario and do not account for negative behaviour.
Figure A.5: Level 0 interaction diagram - calculate likelihood value
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Figure A.6: Level 1 interaction diagram - calculate likelihood value
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Figure A.7: Level 2 interaction diagram - calculate likelihood value
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Figure A.8: Level 3 interaction diagram - calculate likelihood value
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Figure A.9: Level 4 interaction diagram - calculate likelihood value
Assign likelihood value
This use case describes the system behaviour when a user tries to assign a
likelihood value to a CORAS diagram element. Note that this description must
be considered as deprecated since there has been some adjustments with respect
to its functionality. This use case automatically calculates likelihood values upon
assignment, while this has later been changed to an own use case initiated by
the user.
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Figure A.10: Level 0 interaction diagram - assign likelihood value
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Figure A.11: Level 1 interaction diagram - assign likelihood value
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Figure A.12: Level 2 interaction diagram - assign likelihood value
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Figure A.13: Level 3 interaction diagram - assign likelihood value
The SCORE tool implementation specific design
Here we provide a total overview of the containing classes of the SCORE tool,
and full details of a number of selected classes with their respective attributes
and operations.
































































































The following pages contain a full SRS for the SCORE tool. The document
is prepared using a standard SINTEF template for the SINTEF ICT’s hard-
ware/software development process. The layout of the document thus deviates
from the rest of this report, but on the other hand serves the purpose of being
implemented as documentation for the SCORE tool within the organisation.
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This document describes top level requirements for a method to analyse qualitative information in 
the risk estimation phase during a risk analysis using the CORAS methodology. The work that 
this document deals with is a part of the master thesis with the title: “A tool-supported method for 
risk estimation using CORAS diagrams”[1]. 
1.1 Scope/purpose of document 
This document establishes the functional and technical requirements for the development of the 
SCORE tool. As in most software development processes, the requirements specification 
contracts the deliverance from the developer(s) to the customer, but here the document also serves 
the purpose of success criteria upon which the master thesis will be evaluated. 
 
The scope of the specification is limited to the technical design and implementation of the tool. 
An own section of the thesis is dedicated to the behavior of the tool’s underlying method for 
qualitative analysis/risk estimation. 
1.2 Overview of system 
The SCORE tool adds new functionality to the already existing system, the CORAS tool, enabling 
the risk analysts to handle qualitative information in a systematic manner. A thorough 
introduction to the tool and its methodology can be read in [1], but a brief introduction is given 
below. 
 
The part of the system that the SCORE tool deals with is used during the risk estimation phase 
(activity 3 in the CORAS method [6]). During the related risk estimation meeting with the client, 
the risk analysis team collects qualitative data used to estimate the risk level of already identified 
risks. The values are measures for likelihood and consequences related to treat scenarios, 
unwanted incidents and assets. Much confusion and vague estimation has been proved through 
repeated field trials to come to pass, and the SCORE tool aims to assist the risk analysts to 
overcome the troublesome activity.  
 
By breaking a problem down into smaller pieces we believe that humans are more capable to 
assign correct estimations to complex problems (divide and conquer). Where the CORAS 
methodology requires the analysts to come up with likelihood estimations for unwanted incidents 
which compound (possibly) of several paths leading to the incident, the SCORE tool allows to 
(only) estimate the level at the threat scenarios which may be by far less complex than the other. 
Then the SCORE tool applies the SCORE method to aggregate the estimation data granting the 
requested estimates for the unwanted incidents.  
1.3 Document overview 
Chapter 1 is an introduction to this paper that motivates the purpose and scope of the document 
and provides an overall overview of the system for which the requirements specification applies 
to. Next we give a brief, but more technical oriented introduction to the system in chapter 2. In 
chapter 3 we document the user requirements for the tool, while chapter 4 defines the system 






QAIC A tool supported method for qualitative analysis in CORAS 
  
SRS Software Requirements Specification 
TBC To be completed 
TBD To be defined. 
  
UI Unwanted incident 






2 User requirements 
The user requirements specify the external behavior of the system from a non-technical point of 
view. We present the requirements using textual notion, and they are the origin of the use cases 
presented in [1]. The user requirements shall embrace all functionality provided by the SCORE 
from a user’s perspective. 
 
[UR-1]: Select diagram element 
- The user shall at any time be able to select any number of elements from the CORAS 
diagram and get the desired functionality described below ([UR-2], [UR-3] and [UR-
4]). 
Pre-conditions: CORAS diagram with diagram element(s) exists 
Comment: This does not apply when the user is in the path view. 
[UR-2]: Select single node 
- The user shall at any time be able to select a single node from the CORAS diagram 
and get an overview of its properties its properties. 
Pre-conditions: [UR-1], node exists 
Comment: This does not apply when the user is in the path view. 
[UR-3]: Select edge 
- The user shall at any time be able to select an edge from the CORAS diagram and get 
an overview of its properties. 
Pre-conditions: [UR-1], edge exists 
Comment: This does not apply when the user is in the path view. 
[UR-4]: Select multiple diagram elements 
- The user shall at any time be able to select multiple nodes from the CORAS diagram 
and get the path view to handle a path. 
Pre-conditions: [UR-1], nodes exists 
[UR-5]: Assign likelihood value 
- The user shall be able to assign a likelihood value to a node or initiate edge 
- The user shall get legal likelihood values proposed, but also have the opportunity to 
manually define values. 
- The user shall be able to choose between qualitative and quantitative likelihood values 
where available.  
Pre-conditions: [UR-2] or [UR-3] conditionally 
[UR-6]: Assign consequence value 
- The user shall be able to assign a consequence value to a harm edge 
- The user shall get legal consequence values proposed, but also have the opportunity to 
manually define values. 
- The user shall be able to choose between qualitative and quantitative consequence 
values where available.  
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Pre-conditions: [UR-3] where edge is a harm edge 
[UR-7]: Import likelihood values 
- The user shall be able to import likelihood values from the likelihood tables in the 
CORAS tool (on-demand) 
- The likelihood values shall be imported automatically when the diagram-editor is 
started from the CORAS tool 
Pre-conditions: likelihood values are defined 
[UR-8]: Import consequence values 
- The user shall be able to import consequence values from the consequence tables in the 
CORAS tool 
- The consequence values shall be imported automatically when the diagram-editor is 
started from the CORAS tool 




3 System requirements 
Below the functional requirements of the tool and how it shall be implemented with the CORAS 
tool are presented. 
3.1.1 Functional requirements 
The SCORE tool shall 
 
[SR-1]: provide a pane for the various risk estimation functions containing: 
- property view - for single node or edge 
- path view - for multiple node 
- problem view - to flag warnings 
- likelihood view - to display likelihood table 
- consequence view - to display consequence tables (one for each asset) 
 
[SR-2]: display properties in the property view when a single node is selected 
Properties: 
- type - the element type 
- body - content of the element 
- likelihood - the element's assigned likelihood value 
- consequence - the element's assigned consequence value 
 
[SR-3]: display properties in the property view when an edge is selected 
Properties: 
- type - the edge type 
- likelihood/consequence - the edge's assigned likelihood or consequence value 
- source - the initiating element 
- target - the initiated element 
 
[SR-4]: display selected path in the path view when multiple nodes are selected 
- perform consistency check on selected path 
- flag warning if path is inconsistent 
 
[SR-5]: allow for likelihood values to be assigned to a node or edge when selected 
- propose legal values 
- allow for manually selected values 
- pin inconsistency warning if manually selected values are assigned 
- present the legal values through a drop-down box 
 
[SR-6]: allow for consequence values to be assigned to a harm edge when selected 
- propose legal values 
- allow for manually selected values 
- pin inconsistency warning if manually selected values are assigned 
- present the legal values through a drop-down box 
 
[SR-7]: automatically calculate likelihood on assignment or changes in likelihood values 
- perform a least set required (LSR) check to determine if the affected diagram elements 
holds the required likelihood values for calculation 
- calculate the likelihood values according to the SCORE method upon validation of the 
LSR-check 




3.1.2 Derived requirements 
The system requirements above are mostly general requirements that need to be broken down into 
further detail. Below we present their derived requirements annotated with [DR-n,m], where n is 
the SR number to which it belongs and m is the derived number. 
 
[DR-1.1]:  the property view shall automatically be updated to hold the properties of the 
selected element immediately when a new element gains focus 
- when no element is selected, the property view shall display the properties of the 
diagram 
[DR-1.1]: the property view shall be composed of a two-column table where each row is 
assigned to an unique property  
- column one describes which property 
- the second column is an interactive field for the user to alter the properties 
Comment: Some fields of the interactive column may be fixed, such as “Type”, since they 
are not changeable 
[DR-1.1]: the path view shall automatically be updated immediately when a new path gains 
focus 
[DR-1.2]: the likelihood view shall be composed of a two-column table of five rows that 
defines the linguistic variables and their corresponding probabilistic intervals (numerical) 
[DR-1.3]: the consequence view shall be composed of a two-column table of five rows that 
defines the linguistic variables and their corresponding numerical intervals 
 
 
[DR-2.1]: the type row shall be fixed and displaying the element’s type (i.e.: threat scenario, 
unwanted incident) 
[DR-2.2]: the body row shall be interactive 
- the row shall allow the user to alter the body content 
- the row shall at any time display the actual and updated content of the node 
[DR-2.3]: the likelihood row shall be interactive 
- the row shall allow the user to alter the likelihood value through a drop-down box 
containing legal likelihood values or manually insert an inconsistent value 
- the row shall at any time display the actual and updated likelihood value of the node 
[DR-2.4]: the consequence row shall be inactive 
- consequence values shall only be allowed to insert on harm edges 
 
 
[DR-3.1]: the type row shall be fixed and displaying the edge’s type (i.e.: initiate edge, harm 
edge) 
[DR-3.2]: the body row shall be inactive 
- edges shall not have any body other than likelihood/consequence values 
[DR-3.3]: the likelihood/consequence row shall be interactive 
- the row shall allow the user to alter the likelihood value through a drop-down box 
containing legal likelihood values or manually insert an inconsistent value if the edge 
is an initiate edge 
- the row shall allow the user to alter the consequence value through a drop-down box 
containing legal likelihood values or manually insert an inconsistent value if the edge 
is a harm edge 
- the row shall at any time display the actual and updated likelihood or consequence 
value of the edge 
[DR-3.4]: the source row shall be fixed 
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- the row shall display the edge’s source (i.e.: threat scenario, unwanted incident) 
[DR-3.5]: the target row shall be fixed 
- the row shall display the edge’s target (i.e.: threat scenario, unwanted incident, asset) 
 
4 Technical requirements (non-functional requirements) 
[TR-1]: The SCORE tool shall be implemented with purpose and possibility of being distributed 
with the future release version 3.0 of the CORAS tool 
[TR-2]: The SCORE shall be implemented with low coupling internally such that each internal 
component is easy to alter separately 
[TR-3]: The SCORE tool shall allow the standalone editor of the CORAS risk modeling 
language to run independent of the CORAS tool (full version) 
- The editor shall provide the ability to manually insert likelihood values when the 
likelihood table is not present (refer to [SR-5]:) 
- The editor shall provide the ability to manually insert consequence values when the 
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Appendix C
Security risk analysis of
Stubrud sjakk-shop
The following pages contain the CORAS security risk analysis of Stubrud sjakk-
shop. The document is prepared using the CORAS tool, thus the layout of the
document deviates from the rest of this report.
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This report presents the results from a security risk analysis performed at STUBRUD
SJAKK SHOP. The target of the analysis is the company's e-commerce IT
infrastructure. The security risk analysis is performed as a case study to evaluate the
SCORE project and therefore concentrate with special emphasis on the risk estiamtion
phase, but is at the same time commissioned by STUBRUD SJAKK SHOP (hereby
refered to as Sjakk shop) as a commercial security risk analysis.
1.1 Objective
The security risk analysis (hereby refered to as the risk analyisis or RA) has two main
objectives to accommodate the interests of both the Sjakk shop and the SCORE
evaluation. First of all we identify and analyse risks related to the target of analysis in
the Sjakk shop. Main focus for the target of analysis is the availability of the local
computer system and confidentiality of sensitive data. The SCORE project's main
objective is to evaluate the SCORE method and tool which concerns the phase of risk
estimation.
1.2 Scope
The risk analysis is restricted to handle only the Sjakk shop processes in which affects
the IT infrastructure of the business. It also focuses on the system as it works today
and the system parts that are under daily maintenance of the Sjakk shop manager.
This means that physical assets like product stock and the outsourced webhosting of
the business' home site and accounting system is out of scope. However; we include
the possibilty of future expansion of the present e-commerce to become a full e-trade
site with product payment as an online service, and the availability of the home site as
to what lies under the Sjakk shop manager's domain of influence.
1.3 Team and plan
The persons involved in the risk analysis:
Name Role Organisation Background/expertise
Stig Torsbakken RA leader SINTEF Risk analysis
Jan Magne Stubrud Target owner/field expert Sjakk shop Business manager
Table: 1
The risk analysis is conducted in accordance with the CORAS method for
Model-based Risk Analysis developed in the CORAS and SECURIS projects. The
CORAS risk management process consists of the following five sub-processes:
• Context identification: Identify the context of the analysis. Describe the
application(s) and/or organization, identify usage scenarios, the assets of the
target of analysis, and the risk evaluation criteria.
• Risk identification: Identify the potential threats to assets and the
vulnerabilities of these assets. Identify unwanted incidents.
• Risk estimation: Estimate the consequence and frequency value of each
unwanted incident identified in the risk identification phase.
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• Risk evaluation: Identify the level of risk associated with the unwanted
incidents already identified and assessed in the previous sub-processes.
• Risk treatment: Address the treatment of the identified risks, and how to
prevent the unacceptable risks.
1.4 Terminology
• Analysis leader: The person who leads the structured brainstorming sessions
and maintains contact with the client between sessions.
• Analysis secretary: The person who documents the results during the sessions
with the client.
• Analysis team: The group of persons who conduct the risk analysis, including
the analysis leader and analysis secretary.
• Risk analysis: The process of context identification, risk identification, risk
estimation, risk evaluation and risk treatment.
• Structured workshop: A workshop involving experts on the target of analysis
to identify and analyse risks.
• Target of analysis: The organization or system that is the object of analysis.
External entities that may affect the security of the target are also analysed.
• Asset: Anything considered to be of value for the client; thus something the
client wants to protect
• Vulnerability: A weakness or flaw of the system that a threat may take
advantage of
• Threat: A human or a non-human entity that may cause an event that harms
an asset (deliberatly or accidentally)




The purpose of the context identification is to characterise the target of the analysis
and its environment and to agree on fundamental assumptions. Most of the
documentation on the target of analysis is located in appendix 1. However, in this
section we include a short description of the business and the persons involved in the
risk analysis as the target of evaluation. Thereafter we present the assets and show an
overall picture of the system. At last we define the likelihood and consequence scales
and the risk evaluation matrices.
What is left out of the main report and included in appendix 1, is the formal and
detailed system specifications and the system activities descriptions including activity
diagrams and sequence diagrams of the system processes.
2.1 Target of evaluation
The target of evaluation is the IT-infrastructure of a one man enterprise owned and
managed by Jan Magne Stubrud. The business Sjakk shop is an e-commerce supplier
of chess products for the general public, schools and chess clubs. Stubrud runs his
business from his private home and has the full responsibility and does all work tasks
himself without employees.
The sjakk-shop holds a good reputation among chess interested in Norway as a
reliable supplier of chess products. The corporate policy of sjakk-shop is summarised
to:
The sjakk-shop shall
• only have satisfied customers
• deliver on time
• always be available
• provide good information to the customers throughout the purchasing process
The sjakk-shop is mainly located at three physical locations: the company
management center including a local computer system and a product stock at
Stubrud's private home, the web site and web management at a third party web
hosting company, and the accounting system at a third party accountancy firm. Figure
2 explains the situation visually:
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The outsourced third party targets fall outside the scope of the risk analysis since the
security management of their systems are not within the field of responsibility of the
sjakk-shop manager. The communication between the sjakk shop, its customers and
suppliers is mainly through internet, e-mail or telephone. An example of a typical
ordering process is sketched in figure 5 under the system description.
2.2 Asset identification
In figure 3 you can see a full overview of all the identified assets with respect to the
TOE:
In order to keep the risk analysis limited to a reasonable size, we choose to focus
exclusively on direct assets and only those of highest importance and relevance. Table




Asset ID Description Value
E-mail/customer register
confidentiality
The confidentiality of the company's e-mail
and customer registry located at the local
computer system
375 000
E-mail availability The availability of the the sjakk-shop e-mail 25 000
Table: 2
2.3 System description
To illustrate most central business activities, we here present an overall use case
diagram. Note that the diagram only contains the use cases within scope.
From the use cases you see that they are in general concerned around the product
ordering acitivities. What happens when a customer orders a product is best described
with the sequence diagram below:
Figure: 4
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In words; when a customer has placed an order at the sjakk-shop website, the manager
receives this as an e-mail (on his local computer normally, but not necessarily) with
the order details. He then contacts the customer on telephone (preferably, but e-mail
correspondance could occur) and requests payment details (credit card number or
invoice details) that in turn is validated with the credit card company. Finally, he does
requisite invoicing at his accounting system and ships the ordered product.
2.4 Frequency and consequence scales
When we evaluate which risks we can accept and which we have to treat, we assign
the risks likelihood and consequence values to be able to compare them. Below we
present the likelihood and consequence values scales used for this purpose.
Likelihood can be represented either as frequency values above that indicates a
statistical measure based on known history or estimated data, or as probability values
as given below in figure 7. The CORAS method does not define both representations,





2.5 Risk evaluation matrices
To compare the identified risks and establish the level of risk that Sjakk shop can
accept and what level that needs to be evaluated for treatment, we use the risk
evaluation matrices below to define the risk evaluation criteria. If a risk ends up in the
green area, it is accepted, but otherwise we have to look into the risk for possible








3. Risk identification and estimation
The risk identification section presents the identified risks.
Figure: 12
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4.3 Risk evaluation matrices with risks
The risk evaluation matrices illustrates the risk level for each risk graphically. We
easily get an overview of what risks we have to evaluate for treatment.
Figure: 18
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6. Conclusions and recommendations
This report documents the results from the risk analysis performed at Sturbrud
sjakk-shop of the company's IT-infrastructure. Main focus of the risk anaysis was in
particular e-mail and customer registrer analysed with respect to confidentiality and
availability.
Assets are defined as: e-mail/customer register confidentiality and e-mail availability
in the context identification phase. During this phase there were also defined
frequency, probability and consequence values together with risk evaluation critera
upon which the risks are evaluated for acceptance or treatment.
To the respective assets, the following threats were found:
E-mail/customer register confidentiality:
• Industrial espionage agent uses confidential information to capture customers
• Hacker or accidental uses confidential information to scam customers
E-mail availability:
• Virus, accidental or hacker makes e-mail inaccessible from local computer
• Virus, accidental or hacker makes e-mail inaccessible from any computer at
home office
To the unwanted incidents identified for each of the scenarios above, there were
assigned likelihood and consequence values that together with their respective asset
constitutes the risk to each of the assets. Based on the risk evaluation criteria, R1 to
the asset e-mail/customer register confidentiality was eliminated, while R2, R3 and
R4 needed to be evaluated for treatment.
The suggested treatments generally involves keeping firewall and anti-virus up to date
and encrypt wireless LAN with WPA-2 instead of WEP. Furthermore, we recommend
to introduce a corporate security policy. All users of the company's IT-infrastructure
need to be made aware of such policy and suffiniently trained.
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7. Appendix 1: Context Identification documentation
7.1 System specifications
Here we present the formal and detailed system specifications.
The total overview
Below we show an informal overview of the business followed by a UML class
diagram that tries to formally specify the entities from the first figure and assigning
them appropriate attributes and methods.
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The SCORE tool test results
As a part of the evaluation of the SCORE tool, we have conducted a testing of
the tool in an experimental setting. We have created a set of specially designed
test scenarios explained below that the tool was tested on. Subsequently follows
listings of the test records that yield the results on how the tool responded on
the test scenarios.
The test scenarios are presented using a frame similar to the one we used to
define the SCORE method rules in chapter 4. Its semantics is similar with the
first compartment stating the assumptions or the input, except that the second
one now displays the result of the calculation.
Test scenarios
We have tested the following scenarios on the SCORE tool:
1. 1-to-1 complete relationships (numerical)
2. Many-to-1 complete relationships (numerical)
3. 1-to-1 complete relationships (linguistic)
4. Many-to-1 complete relationships (linguistic)
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Test records
1-to-1 complete relationships (numerical)
We try to perform three simple 1-to-1 incomplete relationships probability cal-
culations.














l = [0.0, 0.010000000000000002]
k = [0.0, 0.1]
j = [0.81, 1.0]
All three calculated probability sets seems reasonable. None of them gets in-
creased probability and the new likelihood sets are all within the boundaries of
a legal sample space of [0, . . . , 1] for probability values. There is however a very
small round-off error at the first result (l).
Many-to-1 relationships (numerical)
We try to perform a probability calculation with a disproportionately high num-
ber of initiating incidents with a distributed sample space to the extreme.
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l = [0.0800000000000002 − 0.21]
The examination indicates the rule to be valid, but there are however a slight
round-off error.
1-to-1 complete relationships (linguistic)

















Verylow = [0 − 0.1]
If we compare these results to those provided in the corresponding numerical
test above, we see they are identical with respect to their numerical values and
how they are mapped to the linguistic.
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Many-to-1 relationships (linguistic)























Verylow = [0 − 0.1]
If we compare these results to those provided in the corresponding numerical
test above, we see they are identical with respect to their numerical values and
how they are mapped to the linguistic.
Interval selection for linguistic representation
In the top compartment we show which linguistic value we assigned the diagram
node. The likelihood definitions are the same as we have used above. The
second compartment shows the same nodes, but illustrated with the numerical
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